Worker Absenteeism and Sick Pay

An economic analysis of absenteeism based on a model of the markets for absence and sick pay.

John Treble (Author), Tim Barmby (Author)

9780521806954, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 26 May 2011

234 pages, 36 b/w illus. 9 tables
23.5 x 15.6 x 1.5 cm, 0.5 kg

'John Treble and Tim Barmby have achieved a tour de force. Their book makes very imaginative use of economic theory, illustrated with amusing and illuminating anecdotes. They argue that we should think of absence behaviour as the result of a bargain between employers and their employees, and that medical and psychological factors are only part of the picture. The nature of this bargain explains why some organisations have higher absence rates than others. This opens up scope for considering a much wider range of policies to deal with absence than the traditional ones. Their conclusions will be of interest to practitioners and researchers well beyond the economics fold.' David Marsden, Professor of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics

Absenteeism is the single most important cause of lost labour time, yet it has received much less scholarly attention than more dramatic forms of industrial disruption, such as strikes. Arguing that any explanation of absence rates must take into account the interests of both employers and employees, this book constructs a model of the markets for absence and sick pay. These are not independent since sick pay affects workers' incentives to be absent, and absences affect employers' willingness to pay sick pay. The book reviews the available empirical evidence relating to both markets, stressing the importance of careful identification of the effect of the price of absence on demand, since this is a crucial quantity for firms' policies. It concludes by discussing the implications of the model for human resources management, and for the role of the state in sick pay provision.

List of figures
List of tables
Preface
1. Introduction
2. The supply of absence and the provision of sick pay
3. The demand for absence
4. The markets for absence and for sick pay
5. A brief introduction to identification
6. The market for absence: empirical evidence
7. The demand for absence: empirical evidence
Appendix to Chapter 7
8. Policy implications for firms
9. Policy implications for states
10. Conclusion
References
Index.

Subject Areas: Employment contracts [LNHU], Personnel & human resources management [KJMV2], Employment & unemployment [KCFM], Labour economics [KCF], Economics of industrial organisation [KCD]