What Minds Can Do
Intentionality in a Non-Intentional World

This 1997 book explores the representational powers of a person's mind.

Pierre Jacob (Author)

9780521574013, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 23 January 1997

312 pages
21.6 x 14 x 2.1 cm, 0.55 kg

'... the book addresses issues that are central to much contemporary philosophical debate, in both Anglo-Saxon and Continental philosophy. It will be of interest to a wide range of readers in philosophy of mind and language, cognitive science and psychology.' French Book News

Some of a person's mental states have the power to represent real and imagined states of affairs: they have semantic properties. What Minds Can Do has two goals: to find a naturalistic or non-semantic basis for the representational powers of a person's mind, and to show that these semantic properties are involved in the causal explanation of the person's behaviour. In the process, this 1997 book addresses issues that are central to much contemporary philosophical debate. It will be of interest to a wide range of readers in philosophy of mind and of language, cognitive science, and psychology.

Part I. The Naturalization of Intentionality: 1. What is intentional realism?
2. Introduction to informational semantics
3. Three problems for informational semantics
4. Information and teleology
Part II. The Casual Role of Intentionality: 5. The computational representational theory of mind (CRTM)
6. Must an intentional realist be a meaning atomist?
7. Functionalism and the threat of pre-emption
8. Explaining intentional behaviour
9. Conclusion: a postlude on semantics and psychology
References
Index.

Subject Areas: Philosophy of mind [HPM]