Warlords and Coalition Politics in Post-Soviet States

Combining quantitative and qualitative methods, this book presents a revisionist account of the post-Soviet wars and their settlement.

Jesse Driscoll (Author)

9781107636453, Cambridge University Press

Paperback / softback, published 27 July 2017

263 pages, 11 b/w illus. 3 maps 11 tables
23 x 15.3 x 1.5 cm, 0.41 kg

'His book makes a number of important insights that contribute to our body knowledge on civil war … the book presents an interesting argument.' Christopher A. Stevens, The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review

The break-up of the USSR was unexpected and unexpectedly peaceful. Though a third of the new states fell prey to violent civil conflict, anarchy on the post-Soviet periphery, when it occurred, was quickly cauterized. This book argues that this outcome had nothing to do with security guarantees by Russia or the United Nations and everything to do with local innovation by ruthless warlords, who competed and colluded in a high-risk coalition formation game. Drawing on a structured comparison of Georgian and Tajik militia members, the book combines rich comparative data with formal modeling, treating the post-Soviet space as an extraordinary laboratory to observe the limits of great powers' efforts to shape domestic institutions in weak states.

1. Revisionist history
2. Predator collusion: a high-stakes game
3. Kto kogo?
4. Warlord coalitions and militia politics
5. Coup-proofing
6. Implications
Case selection and external validity
Mathematical proofs
Anonymous warlords.

Subject Areas: Comparative politics [JPB]