Virtue and Meaning
A Neo-Aristotelian Perspective

Argues that any adequate neo-Aristotelian virtue ethic must account for our distinctive nature as the meaning-seeking animal.

David McPherson (Author)

9781108745192, Cambridge University Press

Paperback / softback, published 15 July 2021

231 pages
22.8 x 15.2 x 1.3 cm, 0.349 kg

'This book could be read by undergraduates and seasoned academics alike. McPherson does a good job of summarizing the relevant aspects of contemporary virtue theory such that students unfamiliar with this literature should still be able to follow the argument, but not at the expense of nuance.' Sarah Pawlett Jackson, Religious Studies Review

The revival of Aristotelian virtue ethics can be seen as a response to the modern problem of disenchantment, that is, the perceived loss of meaning in modernity. However, in Virtue and Meaning, David McPherson contends that the dominant approach still embraces an overly disenchanted view. In a wide-ranging discussion, McPherson argues for a more fully re-enchanted perspective that gives better recognition to the meanings by which we live and after which we seek, and to the fact that human beings are the meaning-seeking animal. In doing so, he defends distinctive accounts of the relationship between virtue and happiness, other-regarding demands, and the significance of linking neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics with a view of the meaning of life and a spiritual life where contemplation has a central role. This book will be valuable for philosophers and other readers who are interested in virtue ethics and the perennial question of the meaning of life.

Introduction: toward re-enchantment
1. The human form of life
1.1 Neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism: the disenchanted version
1.2 The human difference: rationality
1.3 The standpoint from within our human form of life: the space of meaning
1.4 Strong evaluative meaning
1.5 Going further: the way forward
2. Virtue, happiness, and meaning
2.1 The instrumentalist account
2.2 The constitutive account: strong evaluative version
2.3 The constitutive account: weak evaluative version
2.4 Virtue apart from happiness?
2.5 Virtue, loss, and the meaning of life
3. Other-regarding concern
3.1 MacIntyre on other-regarding concern
3.2 Intrinsic worth: dignity and sanctity
3.3 Fully amongst us: solidarity with the severely afflicted and other marginalized humans
3.4 Moral absolutes
3.5 Spheres of other-regarding concern: universal and particular
4. Cosmic outlooks
4.1 Hursthouse's three theses and Williams' challenge
4.2 Identifying what is noblest and best
4.3 Against quietism: the need for a moral ontology
4.4 Rival cosmic outlooks
4.5 A poker-faced universe?
5. Homo Religiosus
5.1 What is spirituality?
5.2 What kind of naturalism?
5.3 Human beings as Homo Religiosus
5.4 The contemplative life
5.5 Theistic spirituality
5.6 Objections and replies
Conclusion.

Subject Areas: Ethical issues & debates [JFM], Philosophy of religion [HRAB], Ethics & moral philosophy [HPQ]