Uncivil War
The British Army and the Troubles, 1966–1975

Reveals the full story of the British army's role in the most violent phase of the Troubles.

Huw Bennett (Author)

9781316501832, Cambridge University Press

Paperback / softback, published 15 January 2026

558 pages
27 x 18 x 3.4 cm, 0.573 kg

'[A] fascinating, provocative, humane and objective study which rewrites the history of the British Army in Northern Ireland in these pivotal years and more broadly suggests the way that military history can and should be written.' Tony Craig, English Historical Review

When Operation Banner was launched in 1969 civil war threatened to break out in Northern Ireland and spread over the Irish Sea. Uncivil War reveals the full story of how the British army acted to save Great Britain from disaster during the most violent phase of the Troubles but, in so doing, condemned the people of Northern Ireland to protracted, grinding conflict. Huw Bennett shows how the army's ambivalent response to loyalist violence undermined the prospects for peace and heightened Catholic distrust in the state. British strategy consistently underestimated community defence as a reason for people joining or supporting the IRA whilst senior commanders allowed the army to turn in on itself, hardening soldiers to the suffering of ordinary people. By 1975 military strategists considered the conflict unresolvable: the army could not convince Catholics or Protestants that it was there to protect them and settled instead for an unending war.

Introduction
1. Baggage
2. The army's short-lived Ulster honeymoon
3. Escalation and the erosion of impartiality
4. Edward Heath's bid for victory
5. The road to Bloody Sunday
6. The most deadly year
7. Strategy in the shadow of loyalist power
8. We cannot envisage peace
Conclusion
A note on sources.

Subject Areas: Military history [HBW]