Topics in Microeconomics
Industrial Organization, Auctions, and Incentives

This text in microeconomics focuses on the strategic analysis of markets under imperfect competition, incomplete information, and incentives.

Elmar Wolfstetter (Author)

9780521645348, Cambridge University Press

Paperback, published 28 October 1999

392 pages, 53 b/w illus. 12 tables
24.6 x 18.9 x 2.1 cm, 0.7 kg

'Wolfstetter has done an excellent job in making the theoretical literature accessible to a student audience. This is a highly readable and balanced account of the new topics in economic theory.' Motty Perry, Hebrew University

This text in microeconomics focuses on the strategic analysis of markets under imperfect competition, incomplete information, and incentives. Part I of the book covers imperfect competition, from monopoly and regulation to the strategic analysis of oligopolistic markets. Part II explains the analytics of risk, stochastic dominance, and risk aversion, supplemented with a variety of applications from different areas in economics. Part III focuses on markets and incentives under incomplete information, including a comprehensive introduction to the theory of auctions, which plays an important role in modern economics. Each chapter introduces the core issues in an accessible yet rigorous fashion, and then investigates specialized themes. Each also offers self-contained explanations and proofs. The only prerequisites are a basic knowledge of calculus and probability, and familiarity with intermediate undergraduate microeconomics. The text can be used as a textbook in different courses for senior undergraduate or first-year graduate students.

Part I. Imperfect Competition: 1. Monopoly
2. Regulation of monopoly
3. Oligopoly and industrial organization
Part II. Risk, Stochastic Dominance and Risk Aversion: 4. Stochastic dominance: theory
5. Stochastic dominance: applications
6. Risk aversion
Part III. Incomplete Information and Incentives: 7. Matching: the marriage problem
8. Auctions
9. Hidden information and adverse selection
10. Hidden information and signaling
11. Hidden action and moral hazard
12. Rank-order tournaments
Part IV. Technical Supplements: A. Nonlinear optimization: the classical approach
B. Inequality Constrained optimization
C. Convexity and generalizations
D. From expected values to order statistics.

Subject Areas: Microeconomics [KCC]