The World Without, the Mind Within
An Essay on First-Person Authority

A challenging study of the character of our knowledge of our own intentional states.

André Gallois (Author)

9780521560931, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 12 December 1996

228 pages
22.3 x 14.6 x 1.9 cm, 0.388 kg

"...cogently argued and well worth reading..." Dialogue

In this challenging study, André Gallois proposes and defends a thesis about the character of our knowledge of our own intentional states. Taking up issues at the centre of attention in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and epistemology, he examines accounts of self-knowledge by such philosophers as Donald Davidson, Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright, and advances his own view that, without relying on observation, we are able justifiably to attribute to ourselves propositional attitudes, such as belief, that we consciously hold. His study will be of wide interest to philosophers concerned with questions about self-knowledge.

Preface
Introduction
Part I. First-Person Authority: 1. The problem
2. Scepticism about first-person authority
Part II. The Basic and Extended Accounts: 3. A preliminary account
4. Defending the basic account
5. Extending the basic account
6. Objections
7. The problem of scope
Part III. Self-Knowledge and Content Externalism: 8. Arguments from content externalism
9. Deflationary self-knowledge: Davidson and Burge
10. Externalism and first-person authority
11. Psychological properties as secondary
Bibliography
Index.

Subject Areas: Philosophy of mind [HPM]