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The War After the War
The Struggle for Credibility During America's Exit from Vietnam

Johannes Kadura (Author)

9780801453960

Hardback, published 1 February 2016

248 pages, 5 halftones, 2 maps - 2 Maps
22.9 x 15.2 x 2.4 cm, 0.907 kg

The book is a masterpiece of research that is carefully footnoted.... The book presents information that filled gaps in my education.

- Henry Zeybel (The VVA Veteran)

Drawing on extensive research at the Nixon and Ford Presidential Libraries (this reviewer was regaled by archivists at both institutions with tales of exhaustive efforts by a 'scholar named Johannes'), Kadura challenges prevailing interpretations of the U.S. response to Saigon's disintegration. He both synthesizes and augments a long-standing debate over whether the United States desired a 'decent interval' solution in Vietnam, a concept whose nebulous descriptions in previous scholarship are outlined in a helpful bibliographic essay.

(Pacific Historical review)

In The War after the War, Johannes Kadura offers a fresh interpretation of American strategy in the wake of the cease-fire that began in Vietnam on January 28, 1973. The U.S. exit from Vietnam continues to be important in discussions of present-day U.S. foreign policy, so it is crucial that it be interpreted correctly. In challenging the prevailing version of the history of the events, Kadura provides interesting correctives to the different accounts, including the ones of the key actors themselves, President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger foremost among them. In so doing, Kadura aims to forge a synthesis between orthodox and revisionist interpretations of this important period.

Kadura finds that the strategy employed by Nixon and Kissinger centered on the concepts of "equilibrium strategy" and "insurance policy." That approach allowed them to follow a twofold strategy of making a major effort to uphold South Vietnam while at the same time maintaining a fallback strategy of downplaying the overall significance of Vietnam. Whether they won or lost on their primary bet to secure South Vietnam, Nixon and Kissinger expected to come through the crisis in a viable strategic position.

Introduction. Contingency Planning in Turbulent Times
1. The Strategy of the Cease-fire
2. The X Plus 60 Period
3. The Collapse of the Equilibrium Strategy
4. Going Down with Colors Flying
5. Ford and the Fall of Saigon
6. Beyond Defeat in Indochina
Conclusion. A Mixed Record

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