The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods

This book presents an updated and expanded discussion of theoretical treatment of externalities (i.e. uncompensated interdependencies), public goods, and club goods.

Richard Cornes (Author), Todd Sandler (Author)

9780521477185, Cambridge University Press

Paperback, published 28 June 1996

616 pages, 74 b/w illus. 13 tables
22.9 x 15.2 x 3.5 cm, 0.89 kg

This book presents a theoretical treatment of externalities (i.e. uncompensated interdependencies), public goods, and club goods. The new edition updates and expands the discussion of externalities and their implications, coverage of asymmetric information, underlying game-theoretic formulations, and intuitive and graphical presentations. Aimed at well-prepared undergraduates and graduate students making a serious foray into this branch of economics, the analysis should also interest professional economists wishing to survey recent advances in the field. No other single source for the range of materials explored is currently available. Topics investigated include Nash equilibrium, Lindahl equilibria, club theory, preference-revelation mechanism, Pigouvian taxes, the commons, Coase Theorem, and static and repeated games. The authors use mathematical techniques only as much as necessary to pursue the economic argument. They develop key principles of public economics that are useful for subfields such as public choice, labor economics, economic growth, international economics, environmental and natural resource economics, and industrial organization.

Preface
Part I. Introduction to the Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods: 1. Views on market failure
2. Equilibrium concepts in public economics
Part II. Externalities: 3. Theory of externalities
4. Externalities, equilibrium, and optimality
5. Information and externalities
Part III. Public Goods: 6. Pure public goods: Nash-Cournot equilibria and Pareto optimality
7. Alternative mechanisms for the provision of public goods
8. Public goods in general
9. Game theory and public goods
10. Departures from the Nash-Cournot behavior
Part IV. Clubs and Club Goods: 11. Homogeneous clubs and local public goods
12. Clubs in general
13. Institutional forms and clubs
14. Game theory and club goods
15. Uncertainty and club goods
16. Intergenerational clubs
Part V. Applications and Future Directions: 17. Empirical estimation and public goods
18. Applications and empirics
19. Conclusions.

Subject Areas: Economic theory & philosophy [KCA]