The Themes of Quine's Philosophy
Meaning, Reference, and Knowledge

Examines Quine's views on meaning, reference and knowledge and addresses numerous problems in the interpretation of key texts.

Edward Becker (Author)

9781107015234, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 28 June 2012

336 pages
23.5 x 15.8 x 2.1 cm, 0.67 kg

'I recommend Becker's addition to the ever expanding literature on Quine's philosophy, a body of scholarship to which Becker has contributed significantly.' George L?z?roiu, Review of Contemporary Philosophy

Willard Van Orman Quine's work revolutionized the fields of epistemology, semantics and ontology. At the heart of his philosophy are several interconnected doctrines: his rejection of conventionalism and of the linguistic doctrine of logical and mathematical truth, his rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction, his thesis of the indeterminacy of translation and his thesis of the inscrutability of reference. In this book Edward Becker sets out to interpret and explain these doctrines. He offers detailed analyses of the relevant texts, discusses Quine's views on meaning, reference and knowledge, and shows how Quine's views developed over the years. He also proposes a new version of the linguistic doctrine of logical truth, and a new way of rehabilitating analyticity. His rich exploration of Quine's thought will interest all those seeking to understand and evaluate the work of one of the most important philosophers of the second half of the twentieth century.

Preface
Acknowledgements
1. Conventionalism and the linguistic doctrine of logical truth
2. Analyticity and synonymy
3. The indeterminacy of translation
4. Ontological relativity
5. Criticisms and extensions
Concluding remarks: conventionalism and implications
Bibliography
Index.

Subject Areas: Philosophy of mind [HPM], Philosophy: epistemology & theory of knowledge [HPK], Philosophy [HP], Philosophy of language [CFA]