The Private Sector in Public Office
Selective Property Rights in China

Examines how the private sector in China manages to grow without secure property rights.

Yue Hou (Author)

9781108498159, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 5 September 2019

204 pages, 12 b/w illus. 34 tables
23.4 x 15.6 x 1.6 cm, 0.42 kg

'This fascinating book is a timely addition to the literature, given heated discussions in an era of 'Guo jin min tui' ('the state advances and the private sector retreats') during the Xi administration, especially when one witnesses an exodus from China, during the last few years, of successful businesspeople in their prime. A very valuable resource on political economy and economic development.' D. Li, Choice

This book addresses the long-standing puzzle of how China's private sector manages to grow without secure property rights, and proposes a new theory of selective property rights to explain this phenomenon. Drawing on rich empirical evidence including in-depth interviews, a unique national survey of private entrepreneurs, two original national audit experiments and secondary sources, Professor Yue Hou shows that private entrepreneurs in China actively seek opportunities within formal institutions to advance their business interests. By securing seats in the local legislatures, entrepreneurs use their political capital to deter local officials from demanding bribes, ad hoc taxes, and other types of informal payments. In doing so they create a system of selective, individualized, and predictable property rights. This system of selective property rights is key to understanding the private sector growth in the absence of the rule of law.

1. Introduction
2. Selective property rights
3. Private entrepeneurs in legislative office
4. Motivations to run
5. Protection from predation
6. Legislator status and political capital
7. Conclusion.

Subject Areas: International business [KJK], Political economy [KCP], International economics [KCL], Sociology [JHB], Asian history [HBJF]