The Politics of Quasi-Government
Hybrid Organizations and the Dynamics of Bureaucratic Control

A study of the implications of delegating public policy to quasi-government.

Jonathan G. S. Koppell (Author)

9780521525602, Cambridge University Press

Paperback, published 2 November 2006

256 pages, 4 b/w illus. 14 tables
22.8 x 15.2 x 1.6 cm, 0.387 kg

'In bringing our attention to a significant but overlooked segment of the federal bureaucracy, Koppell brings a fresh perspective to the literature on democratic accountability of administrative institutions. Two findings in particular - that there is variation from one setting to the next in the fundamental agency control challenge faced by elected officials, and that agencies are strategically sophisticated actors in the policy arena - mark distinct advances in the literature on control of the bureaucracy.' David C. Nixon, Georgia State University

Hybrid organizations, governmental entities that mix characteristics of private and public sector organizations, are increasingly popular mechanisms for implementing public policy. Koppell assesses the performance of the growing quasi-government in terms of accountability and control. Comparing hybrids to traditional government agencies in three policy domains - export promotion, housing and international development - Koppell argues that hybrid organizations are more difficult to control largely due to the fact that hybrids behave like regulated organizations rather than extensions of administrative agencies. Providing a rich conception of the bureaucratic control problem, Koppell also argues that hybrid organizations are intrinsically less responsive to the political preferences of their political masters and suggests that as policy tools they are inappropriate for some tasks. This book provides a timely study of an important administrative and political phenomenon.

List of figures
List of tables
Acknowledgements
List of acronyms
1. Introduction
2. Building a better model of bureaucratic control
3. Administration by regulation
4. Principal's preference, organizational structure and the likelihood of control
5. Hybrid organizations and the alignment of interests
6. The limits of congressional control: agent structure as constraint
7. Regulating hybrids: structure and control
8. Conclusion
Appendix: background of organizations studied
Interview subjects
References
Index.

Subject Areas: Business & management [KJ], Political economy [KCP], Political control & freedoms [JPV], Political structure & processes [JPH]