The Politics of Property Rights
Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876–1929

This book explains why political instability is not necessarily correlated with economic stagnation.

Stephen Haber (Author), Armando Razo (Author), Noel Maurer (Author)

9780521820677, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 26 May 2003

406 pages, 5 b/w illus. 1 map 64 tables
22.9 x 15.2 x 2.7 cm, 0.77 kg

"Helps to unpack the diffuclt instability-growth puzzle." APSA Perspectives on Politics

This book addresses a puzzle in political economy: why is it that political instability does not necessarily translate into economic stagnation or collapse? In order to address this puzzle, it advances a theory about property rights systems in many less developed countries. In this theory, governments do not have to enforce property rights as a public good. Instead, they may enforce property rights selectively (as a private good), and share the resulting rents with the group of asset holders who are integrated into the government. Focusing on Mexico, this book explains how the property rights system was constructed during the Porfirio Díaz dictatorship (1876–1911) and then explores how this property rights system either survived, or was reconstructed. The result is an analytic economic history of Mexico under both stability and instability, and a generalizable framework about the interaction of political and economic institutions.

1. Introduction
2. Theory: instability, credible commitments, and growth
3. VPI coalitions in historical perspective: Mexico's turbulent politics, 1876–1929
4. Finance
5. Industry
6. Petroleum
7. Mining
8. Agriculture
9. Conclusion.

Subject Areas: Property & real estate [KFFR], Political economy [KCP]