The Particularistic President
Executive Branch Politics and Political Inequality

This book challenges the notion of presidents being the sole steward of American interests through an examination of a range of policies.

Douglas L. Kriner (Author), Andrew Reeves (Author)

9781107038714, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 18 June 2015

248 pages, 40 b/w illus. 5 maps 27 tables
23.5 x 15.8 x 1.9 cm, 0.47 kg

'Political scientists, historians, students of communication studies and political rhetoric, and journalists write many books on the American presidency every year. Although these studies add incrementally to our understanding of executive branch politics, very few new books fundamentally reshape scholarly thinking about the presidency … Douglas Kriner and Andrew Reeves have written a book that meets this threshold, providing a systematic and empirical analysis of presidential efforts to target key constituencies in the electorate with public policy and federal resources … [they] have produced a well-written study that has the potential to reach a broad audience in political science. Scholars of the American presidency and public policy specialists will find The Particularistic President to be an important book that expands their knowledge about the strategic nature of presidential decision making and the implementation of federal policies.' Adam L. Warber, Congress and the Presidency

As the holders of the only office elected by the entire nation, presidents have long claimed to be sole stewards of the interests of all Americans. Scholars have largely agreed, positing the president as an important counterbalance to the parochial impulses of members of Congress. This supposed fact is often invoked in arguments for concentrating greater power in the executive branch. Douglas L. Kriner and Andrew Reeves challenge this notion and, through an examination of a diverse range of policies from disaster declarations, to base closings, to the allocation of federal spending, show that presidents, like members of Congress, are particularistic. Presidents routinely pursue policies that allocate federal resources in a way that disproportionately benefits their more narrow partisan and electoral constituencies. Though presidents publicly don the mantle of a national representative, in reality they are particularistic politicians who prioritize the needs of certain constituents over others.

1. Introduction
2. The origins of presidential particularism
3. Base closings and trade
4. Disaster declarations and transportation grants
5. Federal grants and presidential particularism
6. The electoral rewards of presidential particularism
7. Conclusion.

Subject Areas: Constitution: government & the state [JPHC]