The Law, Economics and Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement

A critical assessment of trade retaliation in the WTO by academics, diplomats and practitioners involved in such actions.

Chad P. Bown (Edited by), Joost Pauwelyn (Edited by)

9781107655355, Cambridge University Press

Paperback / softback, published 2 January 2014

692 pages
22.9 x 15.2 x 3.5 cm, 0.91 kg

The WTO allows its members to retaliate in the face of continued non-compliance. After more than ten years' operation and ten arbitration disputes, this volume assesses the law, economics and politics of trade sanctions in WTO dispute settlement. Including more than thirty contributions from leading academics, trade diplomats and practitioners, it offers a thorough analysis of the legal rules on permissible WTO retaliation as well as an assessment of the economic rationale and calculations behind the mechanism. In addition, it provides first hand experiences of those countries that have obtained WTO authorisation to retaliate, ranging from the United States and the EC to Mexico and Antigua. In this assessment, the question of how to make the system work also for small countries is paramount. Finally, the volume spells out lessons that could be learned from related fields such as remedies for non-compliance in investment arbitration and competition or anti-trust regimes.

Introduction: trade retaliation in WTO dispute settlement: a multi-disciplinary analysis Chad P. Bown and Joost Pauwelyn
Part I. Background and Goal(s) of WTO Retaliation: 1. The nature of WTO arbitrations on retaliation Giorgio Sacerdoti
2. The calculation and design of trade retaliation in context: what is the goal of suspending WTO obligations? Joost Pauwelyn
Comment John Jackson
Comment Alan Sykes
3. Extrapolating purpose from practice: rebalancing or inducing compliance Gregory Shaffer and Daniel Ganin
Part II. A Legal Assessment after Ten Arbitration Disputes: 4. The law of permissible WTO retaliation Thomas Sebastian
Comment Nicolas Lockhart
5. From bananas to Byrd: damage calculation coming of age? Yves Renouf
Part III. An Economic Assessment after Ten Arbitration Disputes: 6. The economics of permissible WTO retaliation Chad P. Bown and Michele Ruta
Comment Alan Winters
7. Sticking to the rules: quantifying the market access protected by WTO retaliation Simon Evenett
Part IV. The Domestic Politics and Procedures for Implementing Trade Retaliation: 8. The United States' experience and practice in suspending WTO obligations Scott Andersen and Justine Blanchet
9. The European Community's experience and practice in suspending WTO obligations Lothar Ehring
10. The politics of selecting trade retaliation in the EC: a view from the floor Hakan Nordström
11. Canada's experience and practice in suspending WTO obligations Vasken Khabayan
12. Is retaliation useful? Observations and analysis of Mexico's experience Jorge Huerta Goldman
13. Procedures for the design and implementation of trade retaliation in Brazil Luiz Salles
14. Retaliation in the WTO: the experience of Antigua and Barbuda in US - gambling Mark Mendel
Part V. Problems and Options for Reform: 15. Evaluating the criticism that WTO retaliation rules undermine the utility of WTO dispute settlement for developing countries Hunter Nottage
16. Optimal sanctions in the WTO: the case for decoupling (and the uneasy case for the status quo) Alan Sykes
Comment: money talks the talk (but does it walk the walk?) Petros Mavroidis
17. Sanctions in the WTO: problems and solutions William Davey
18. The case for multilateral regulation of the domestic decision-making process Reto Malacrida
19. The WTO secretariat and the role of economics in panels and arbitrations Chad P. Bown
Comment: some reflections on the use of economic analysis in WTO dispute settlement proceedings Reto Malacrida
20. The equivalence standard under Article 22.4 DSU: a 'tariffic' misunderstanding? Simon Schropp
Comment: a general equilibrium interpretation of some WTO dispute settlement cases - 4 EU-US trade conflicts Fritz Breuss
Part VI. New Frontiers and Lessons from Other Fields: 21. Cross-retaliation and suspension under the GATS and TRIPS agreements Werner Zdouc
22. Cross-retaliation in TRIPS: issues of law and practice Frederick Abbott
23. Preliminary thoughts on WTO retaliation in the services sector Arthur Appleton
24. Compensation assessments: perspectives from investment arbitration Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler
25. Reforming WTO retaliation: any lessons from competition law? Simon Evenett.

Subject Areas: International economic & trade law [LBBM], International economics [KCL]