The Informal Regulation of Criminal Markets in Latin America

This book shows how police and politicians in Latin America informally regulate drug markets using corruption and violence.

Hernán Flom (Author)

9781009170727, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 25 August 2022

300 pages
23.5 x 15.7 x 2.2 cm, 0.56 kg

'Hernán Flom studies rigorously the relationship between elected politicians and police to explain diverse informal regulatory regimes of drug markets in Argentina and Brazil. This book contributes to theorizing the multiple, and often unexpected, ways in which states interact with drug markets, not only repressing them or enforcing the law, but also tolerating, preying upon, or protecting them. His focus on the police as a pivotal actor expands our knowledge of the intricate dynamics that connect states and criminal markets. The book is an important addition to the literature on criminal violence, drug markets, and policing.' Angélica Durán-Martínez, Associate Professor of Political Science, Director of Global Studies Ph.D. Program, The University of Massachusetts Lowell

This book explains how states informally regulate drug markets in Latin America. It shows how and why state actors, specifically police and politicians, confront, negotiate with, or protect drug dealers to extract illicit rents or prevent criminal violence. The book highlights how, in countries with weak institutions, police act as interlocutors between criminals and politicians. It shows that whether and how politicians control their police forces explains the prevalence of different informal regulatory arrangements to control drug markets. Using detailed case studies built on 180 interviews in four cities in Argentina and Brazil, the book reconstructs how these informal regulatory arrangements emerged and changed over time.

1. Informal regulation of criminal markets in Latin America
2. A theory of drug market regulation
3. Particularistic confrontation: The persistent war between gangs and police in Rio De Janeiro
4. Particularistic negotiation: The decentralization of police corruption and increase in violence in Rosario, Santa Fe
5. Coordinated protection: The consolidation of centralized corruption in Buenos Aires
6. Coordinated coexistence: The consolidation of a police-gang truce in São Paulo
7. Regulation of criminal markets in weak institutional contexts.

Subject Areas: Government powers [LNDH], Criminology: legal aspects [LAR], Regional government policies [JPRB], Regional government [JPR], Central government policies [JPQB], Constitution: government & the state [JPHC], Politics & government [JP]