The Economic Vote
How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results

The book explains how different political and economic circumstances account for the variation in the economic vote.

Raymond M. Duch (Author), Randolph T. Stevenson (Author)

9780521881029, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 24 March 2008

416 pages, 25 tables
23.6 x 15.8 x 2.7 cm, 0.67 kg

'The Economic Vote - a tour de force about economic voting, voters' perceptions of the economy and how they are formed and the important role that institutions and competition play in determining all of these things. … persuasively makes the case that context matters. … The Economic Vote sets the bar high on multiple dimensions.' Journal of Politics

This book proposes a selection model for explaining cross-national variation in economic voting: Rational voters condition the economic vote on whether incumbents are responsible for economic outcomes, because this is the optimal way to identify and elect competent economic managers under conditions of uncertainty. This model explores how political and economic institutions alter the quality of the signal that the previous economy provides about the competence of candidates. The rational economic voter is also attentive to strategic cues regarding the responsibility of parties for economic outcomes and their electoral competitiveness. Theoretical propositions are derived, linking variation in economic and political institutions to variability in economic voting. The authors demonstrate that there is economic voting, and that it varies significantly across political contexts. The data consist of 165 election studies conducted in 19 different countries over a 20-year time period.

1. Introduction
Part I. Describing the Economic Vote in Western Democracies: 2. Defining and measuring the economic vote
3. Patterns of retrospective economic voting in western democracies
4. Estimation, measurement, and specification
Part II. A Contextual Theory of Rational Retrospective Economic Voting: Competency Signals: 5. Competency signals and rational retrospective economic voting
6. What do voters know about economic variation and its sources?
7. Political control of the economy
Part III. A Contextual Theory of Rational Retrospective Economic Voting: Strategic Voting: 8. Responsibility, contention, and the economic vote
9. The distribution of responsibility and economic voting
10. The pattern of contention and the economic vote
Part IV. Conclusion and Summary: 11. Conclusion.

Subject Areas: Economic systems & structures [KCS], Political economy [KCP], Economics [KC], Comparative politics [JPB], Sociology [JHB]