The DNA of Constitutional Justice in Latin America
Politics, Governance, and Judicial Design

Analyzes the political roots of the systems of constitutional justice in Latin America, tracing their development over the last 40 years.

Daniel M. Brinks (Author), Abby Blass (Author)

9781316630914, Cambridge University Press

Paperback / softback, published 8 August 2019

280 pages, 21 b/w illus. 12 tables
24.5 x 17 x 1.5 cm, 0.5 kg

'The increasing political importance of courts and constitutional justice, raises urgent questions about the nature of judicial power. Brinks and Blass offer fresh insights by skilfully combining legal analysis with institutional theory and political economy perspectives on constitution-making - literatures that otherwise rarely speak. They show why we need to pay careful attention to 'the DNA of constitutional governance' - the institutional design inscribed in the constitutional text, that establishes the judges' autonomy and scope of authority - and to the power dynamics and motives that gave rise to these provisions and the coalitions that sustain them. With a rare combination of conceptual innovation, theoretical sophistication, rigorous quantitative analysis, and fine-grained case studies, the book is highly relevant for all scholars and students interested in constitutional governance. It is invaluable for anyone who care about constitutional politics and governance in Latin America - and is a model for similar studies elsewhere.' Siri Gloppen, Universitetet i Bergen, Norway and Research Director, Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), Norway 

In recent times there has been a dramatic change in the nature and scope of constitutional justice systems in the global south. New or reformed constitutions have proliferated, protecting social, economic, and political rights. While constitutional courts in Latin America have traditionally been used as ways to limit power and preserve the status quo, the evidence shows that they are evolving into a functioning part of contemporary politics and a central component of a system of constitutional justice. This book lays bare the political roots of this transformation, outlining a new way to understand judicial design and the very purpose of constitutional justice. Authors Daniel M. Brinks and Abby Blass use case studies drawn from nineteen Latin American countries over forty years to reveal the ideas behind the new systems of constitutional justice. They show how constitutional designers entrust their hopes and fears to dynamic governance systems, in hopes of directing the development of constitutional meaning over time.

1. Constitutional justice in the Americas at the turn of the Millennium
2. Judicial power and the design of constitutional justice
3. The political origins of powerful constitutional courts: constitutional governance and the politics of judicial design
4. Identifying the political origins of constitutional justice through quantitative analysis
5. Guatemala (1985): building constitutional justice in the shadow of Civil War
6. Argentina (1994): negotiating a plural space of constitutional justice
7. Bolivia (2009): governance logic in the new constitutionalism
8. Conclusion: the politics of constitutional justice
Appendix A. Judicial power: concepts and measures.

Subject Areas: Constitutional & administrative law [LND], Judicial powers [LNAA1], Politics & government [JP]