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The Craft of Bureaucratic Neutrality
Interests and Influence in Governmental Regulation of Occupational Safety

This book identifies the political origins of bureaucratic neutrality.

Gregory A. Huber (Author)

9780521872799, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 7 May 2007

266 pages, 26 tables
22.9 x 15.2 x 1.9 cm, 0.56 kg

"Huber mines a mountain of data...The quality of his empirical analysis of OSHA's implementation strategies is truly impressive." Graham K. Wilson, Boston University: American Politics Book Reviews

Are political understandings of bureaucracy incompatible with Weberian features of administrative neutrality? In examining the question of whether interest groups and elected officials are able to influence how government agencies implement the law, this book identifies the political origins of bureaucratic neutrality. In bridging the traditional gap between questions of internal management (public administration) and external politics (political science), Huber argues that 'strategic neutrality' allows bureaucratic leaders to both manage their subordinates and sustain political support. By analyzing the OSH Act of 1970, Huber demonstrates the political origins and benefits of administrative neutrality, and contrasts it with apolitical and unconstrained administrative implementation. Historical analysis, interviews with field-level bureaucrats and their supervisors, and quantitative analysis provide a rich understanding of the twin difficulties agency leaders face as political actors and personnel managers.

1. Bureaucratic power and strategic neutrality
2. Political conflict and the Occupational Safety and Health Act
3. From regulatory search to enforcement
4. Federal oversight and state OSH Act enforcement
5. Conclusion.

Subject Areas: International law [LB], Central government [JPQ], Public administration [JPP], Political science & theory [JPA]

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