The Constitutional Boundaries of European Fiscal Federalism

Explores the proposed models of fiscal federalism that are compatible with the constitutional boundaries of the European legal order.

Brady Gordon (Author)

9781108830096, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 14 April 2022

440 pages
23.5 x 15.8 x 3.5 cm, 0.94 kg

This book bridges the study of European constitutionalism with the study of 'fiscal federalism' – the subfield of public economics concerned with structuring public finances between different levels of government in federal states. On one axis, this book delves into European Union and Member State constitutional law from all EU Member States in order to investigate and identify the existence of permanent constitutional boundaries that will impinge upon the selection of proposed models for EU fiscal federalism. On the second axis, this book engages the study of fiscal federalism in order to determine which institutional configurations known to that field remain legally and economically implementable within those boundaries. It provides a far-reaching investigation of which models of fiscal federalism are compatible with the constitutional boundaries of the European legal order.

Part I. Methods and Introduction: 1. The Constitutional Boundaries of European Fiscal Federalism
2. The Maastricht Architecture of European Fiscal Federalism
3. The Failure and Abrogation of the Maastricht Model
4. Constitutional Criteria for EU Fiscal Federalism
Part II. Maastricht Architecture of European Fiscal Federalism: 5. The Emergent Centralised Architecture of European Fiscal Federalism
6. The Constitutional Boundaries of Economic and Monetary Union
7. The Constitutional Boundaries of Member State Fiscal Sovereignty
8. Principles of Fiscal Federalism for the European Union
Conclusion: Proposed Directions for Future Research and Reform
Bibliography
Index.

Subject Areas: Government powers [LNDH], Constitutional & administrative law [LND], Laws of Specific jurisdictions [LN], Law [L]