The Brain in a Vat

This collection of new essays examines the brain-in-a-vat scenario and its implications, analyses and impact.

Sanford C. Goldberg (Edited by)

9781107069671, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 23 June 2016

280 pages
24.4 x 17 x 1.7 cm, 0.65 kg

'In sum, while its title may suggest a narrow focus, this book contains a remarkable amount of up-to-date material on a variety of live philosophical issues. And yet its starting point in Putnam's reflections on the [brain in a vat] scenario provides a unifying thread. The volume will be of interest to students getting familiarized with metaphysical realism, philosophical naturalism, semantic externalism, and radical scepticism, as well as experts in these respective fields.' Cameron Boult, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

The scenario of the brain in a vat, first aired thirty-five years ago in Hilary Putnam's classic paper, has been deeply influential in philosophy of mind and language, epistemology, and metaphysics. This collection of new essays examines the scenario and its philosophical ramifications and applications, as well as the challenges which it has faced. The essays review historical applications of the brain-in-a-vat scenario and consider its impact on contemporary debates. They explore a diverse range of philosophical issues, from intentionality, external-world scepticism, and the nature of truth, to the extended mind hypothesis, reference magnetism, and new versions of realism. The volume will be a rich and valuable resource for advanced students in metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of mind and language, as well as anyone interested in the relations between language, thought and the world.

1. Introduction: Putnam's reflections on the brain in a vat Sanford C. Goldberg
Part I. Intentionality and the Philosophy of Mind and Language: 2. Putnam on brains in a vat Tony Brueckner
3. How to think about whether we are brains in vats Gary Ebbs
4. Extended minds in vats Sven Bernecker
5. Brains in vats, causal constraints on reference and semantic externalism Jesper Kallestrup
Part II. Epistemology: 6. Putnam on BIVs and radical skepticism Duncan Pritchard and Chris Ranalli
7. BIVs, sensitivity, discrimination, and relevant alternatives Kelly Becker
8. New lessons from old demons: the case for reliabilism Thomas Grundmann
Part III. Metaphysics: 9. Brains in vats and model theory Tim Button
10. Realism, skepticism, and the brain in a vat Janet Folina
11. Rethinking semantic naturalism Igor Douven
12. Internal to what? Contemporary naturalism and Putnam's model-theoretic argument Patricia Marino
13. The model-theoretic argument: from skepticism to a new understanding Gila Sher
14. Eligibility and ideology in the vat Tim Sundell
Bibliography
Index.

Subject Areas: Philosophy of mind [HPM], Philosophy of language [CFA]