The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information

This second edition, with a greater focus on game theory, attempts to unify recent developments in economic theories of uncertainty and information for students.

Sushil Bikhchandani (Author), Jack Hirshleifer (Author), John G. Riley (Author)

9780521541961, Cambridge University Press

Paperback, published 19 August 2013

505 pages, 83 b/w illus.
23 x 15.2 x 2.7 cm, 0.7 kg

'This is a beautifully clear book on the economics of uncertainty and information. The second edition contains a good deal of valuable new material, such as on the production, transmission, acquisition, and aggregation of information.' Eric Maskin, Harvard University, and Nobel Laureate in Economics

There has been explosive progress in the economic theory of uncertainty and information in the past few decades. This subject is now taught not only in departments of economics but also in professional schools and programs oriented toward business, government and administration, and public policy. This book attempts to unify the subject matter in a simple, accessible manner. Part I of the book focuses on the economics of uncertainty; Part II examines the economics of information. This revised and updated second edition places a greater focus on game theory. New topics include posted-price markets, mechanism design, common-value auctions, and the one-shot deviation principle for repeated games.

Part I: 1. Elements of decision under uncertainty
2. Risk-bearing: the optimum of the individual
3. Comparative statics of the risk-bearing optimum
4. Market equilibrium under uncertainty
Part II: 5. Information and informational decisions
6. Information and markets
7. Strategic uncertainty and equilibrium concepts
8. Informational asymmetry and contract design
9. Competition and hidden knowledge
10. Market institutions
11. Long-run relationships and the credibility of threats and promises
12. Information aggregation, transmission, and acquisition.

Subject Areas: Microeconomics [KCC], Economics [KC]