Term Limits and Legislative Representation

This book tests the central arguments made by both supporters and opponents of legislative term limits.

John M. Carey (Author)

9780521552332, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 26 April 1996

234 pages, 8 b/w illus. 30 tables
23.6 x 16 x 2 cm, 0.5 kg

"Carey observes and applies multivariate statistical analysis to a large number of politicians, and his core theoretical argument comes from the U.S. legislative literature." Barry Ames, Latin American Research Review

Virtually all legislative theory is built on the assumption that politicians are first and foremost reelection-seekers, and because so few countries have ever limited legislative reelection, this assumption has rarely been questioned. As a result, political science has been ill-equipped to offer insights on the impact of legislative term limits. Term Limits and Legislative Representation tests the central arguments made by both supporters and opponents of such reform by examining the experience of Costa Rica, the only long-term democracy to impose term limits on legislators, and by providing extensive comparisons with legislatures in Venezuela and the United States. Professor Carey challenges claims made about the effects of term limits on political careers, pork barrel politics, and the effectiveness of political parties in passing their programs.

Part I. Term Limits and Comparative Politics: 1. The electoral disconnection?
2. Institutions and electoral reform: comparing the cases
Part II. The Latin American Cases: 3. Term limits and political careers
4. Term limits and particularism
5. Term limits and legislative party cohesiveness
Part III. Term Limits and the United States: 6. The last term problem
7. Applying lessons about term limits.

Subject Areas: Political structures: democracy [JPHV]