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Structuring Conflict in the Arab World
Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions

This book examines how ruling elites manipulate political opponents in the Middle East.

Ellen Lust-Okar (Author)

9780521838184, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 10 January 2005

296 pages, 7 b/w illus. 6 tables
23.4 x 16.1 x 3 cm, 0.525 kg

'By forcefully drawing attention to the ways in which heretofore neglected fomal institutions shape the strategies of incumbent opposition elites in repressive dictatorships, Ellen Lust-Okar recasts our understanding of the divergent dynamics of protest triggered by economic crisis. Making judicious use of formal models, she advances nover hypotheses about when moderate opposition elites will exploit mass discontent to press demands for political change. Detailed case studies based on extensive primary research persuasively highlight the significance of unified versus divided structures of contestation. This important book is an exemplar of methodological rigor and pluralism, one that sets an impressibley high standard for subsequent works that will build on its insights to further analyze the dynamics of contention and political liberalization in the Middle East and beyond.' David Waldner, University of Virginia

This book examines how ruling elites manage and manipulate their political opposition in the Middle East. In contrast to discussions of government-opposition relations that focus on how rulers either punish or co-opt opponents, this book focuses on the effect of institutional rules governing the opposition. It argues rules determining who is and is not allowed to participate in the formal political arena affect not only the relationships between opponents and the state, but also between various opposition groups. This affects the dynamics of opposition during prolonged economic crises. It also shapes the informal strategies that ruling elites use toward opponents. The argument is presented using a formal model of government-opposition relations. It is demonstrated in the cases of Egypt under Presidents Nasir, Sadat and Mubarek; Jordan under King Husayn; and Morocco under King Hasan II.

List of figures and tables
Acknowledgments
A note on the use of language
Abbreviations
Introduction
1. The manipulation of political opposition
2. Structures of contestation
3. Playing by the rules: the inclusion and exclusion of political oppositions
4. Dynamics of opposition in unified SoCs
5. Opposition dynamics in divided SoCs
6. Formal SoCs and informal political manipulation
Conclusion
Appendix: political forces in Egypt, Jordan and Morocco
Notes
Bibliography
Index.

Subject Areas: Political structure & processes [JPH], Politics & government [JP]

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