Stratified Virtue Epistemology
A Defence

Stratified virtue epistemology explains that knowledge is due to ability rather than luck. Unlike current theories, it does without costs.

J. Adam Carter (Author)

9781009468268, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 18 January 2024

82 pages
23.5 x 15.8 x 1 cm, 0.27 kg

This accessible Element defends version of virtue epistemology shown to have all-things-considered advantages over other views on the market. The view is unorthodox, in that it incorporates Sosa's animal/reflective knowledge distinction, which has thus far had few takers. The author shows why embracing a multi-tiered framework is not a liability within virtue epistemology but instead affords it an edge not attainable otherwise. The particular account of knowledge goes beyond Sosa's own view by introducing and incorporating several theoretical innovations (regarding both basing and risk, as well as the introduction of multiple species of reflective knowledge) which are aimed at revamping how we think about 'high-grade' knowledge, how we attain it, and what it demands of us. The result is a new and improved stratified virtue epistemology that can hold up against scrutiny.

Introduction
1. Virtue epistemology: one level is good
2. Virtue epistemology: two levels is even better
3. Judgemental Knowledge: new twists
References.

Subject Areas: Philosophy [HP]