Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics
Proceedings of the Eighth International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics

This book presents an overview of developments in social choice theory and welfare economics.

William A. Barnett (Edited by), Hervé Moulin (Edited by), Maurice Salles (Edited by), Norman J. Schofield (Edited by)

9780521443401, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 24 February 1995

432 pages, 28 b/w illus. 27 tables
23.5 x 15.9 x 2.9 cm, 0.754 kg

This book presents an overview of developments in social choice theory and welfare economics, drawn from the proceedings of the eighth conference in the International Symposia in Economic Theory and Econometrics series under the general editorship of William Barnett. The volume is divided into four parts, each exploring broad themes in social choice theory and welfare economics. First, an overview of the short, yet intense, period of the subject's historical development. Second, a discussion of the ethical aspects of social choice, encompassing such issues as equal opportunity, individual rights, and population monotonicity. Third, a study of the algebraic and combinatorial aspects of social choice theory. The final section is devoted to a study of aggregation with risk aversion to current and future variables, and the creation of an intertemporal framework to go beyond the usual static description of income distributions measured over a short period.

Introduction and overview Hervé Moulin, Maurice Salles and Norman J. Schofield
Part I. Historical Aspects of Social Choice: 1. The first golden age of social choice, 1784–1803 Ian McLean
Part II. Ethical Aspects of Social Choice: 2. The requisites of equal opportunity Marc Fleurbaey
3. Social choice of individual and group rights Peter J. Hammond
4. Population monotonic allocation rules William Thomson
Part III. Algebraic and Combinatorial Aspects of Social Choice: 5. Condorcet efficiency and social homogeneity William Gehrlein
6. Latticial theory of consensus Bernard Leclerc and Bernard Monjardet
Part IV. Geometric Aspects of Social Choice: 7. Arrow theorems in economic environments James Redekop
8. Inner consistency or not inner consistency: a reformulation in the answer Donald G. Saari
9. Existence of a smooth social function Norman J. Schofield
10. Dynamical convergence in the Euclidean spatial model Craig A. Tovey
Part IV. Social Choice and Co-operative Games: 11. Incentives in market games with asymmetric information Beth Allen
12. A note on implementation and strong dominance Tilman Börgers
13. Coalition-proof communication equilibria Ezra Einy and Bezalel Peleg
14. Stability of coalition structures and the principle of optimal partitioning Michel Le Breton and Shlomo Weber
15. The hold-out game: an experimental study of an infinitely repeated game with two-sided complete information Richard D. McKelvey and Thomas R. Palfrey
Part IV. Other Applications: 16. Exact Aggregation under Risk William A. Barnett
17. The stochastic dominance ordering of income distributions over time: the discounted sum of the expected utilities of incomes Thierry Karcher, Patrick Moyes and Alain Trannoy
Appendix.

Subject Areas: Econometrics [KCH]