Sharing Power, Securing Peace?
Ethnic Inclusion and Civil War

Shows how power-sharing practices reduce violence both preventively and after conflicts by giving potential violent challengers access to central and/or regional power.

Lars-Erik Cederman (Author), Simon Hug (Author), Julian Wucherpfennig (Author)

9781108406550, Cambridge University Press

Paperback / softback, published 7 July 2022

332 pages
22.8 x 15.1 x 1.8 cm, 0.48 kg

'There is little doubt that Cederman, Hug, and Wucherpfennig have written a landmark study in the power-sharing and conflict literature. The sheer volume of empirical evidence in the book is astonishing and sets the standard for cross-national research on civil war. Scholars, students, and policy makers interested in ethnic politics, war, and conflict resolution will all benefit from reading it - especially those inclined to skepticism of power sharing (as this reviewer was). I would also recommend the book to anybody working with observational evidence subject to selection issues, as the authors provide an exemplary model for rigorous and transparent analysis of cross-national data.' Philip A. Martin, Perspectives on Politics

Does power sharing bring peace? Policymakers around the world seem to think so. Yet, while there are many successful examples of power sharing in multi-ethnic states, such as Switzerland, South Africa and Indonesia, other instances show that such arrangements offer no guarantee against violent conflict, including Rwanda, Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe and South Sudan. Given this mixed record, it is not surprising that scholars disagree as to whether power sharing actually reduces conflict. Based on systematic data and innovative methods, this book comes to a mostly positive conclusion by focusing on practices rather than merely formal institutions, studying power sharing's preventive effect, analyzing how power sharing is invoked in anticipation of conflict, and by showing that territorial power sharing can be effective if combined with inclusion at the center. The authors' findings demonstrate that power sharing is usually the best option to reduce and prevent civil conflict in divided states.

1. Introduction
Part I. Theories and concepts
2. Power sharing and conflict in the literature
3. Key concepts and arguments of our approach
Part II. Analyzing the effect of power sharing on civil war
4. Power sharing and civil war: Data and baseline models
5. Contrasting formal power-sharing institutions and practices
6. Endogenizing governmental power sharing and its effect on civil war
7. The strategic logic of governmental power sharing and civil war
8. The effect of territorial and governmental power sharing on civil war
9. The strategic logic of territorial power sharing, secession and civil war
Part III. Power sharing and civil war in time and space
10. The diffusion of power sharing
11. Trends in power sharing and conflict
12. Conclusions for theory and policy.

Subject Areas: Comparative politics [JPB]