Ruling by Statute
How Uncertainty and Vote Buying Shape Lawmaking

This book investigates how the predictability of legislators' behavior and vote buying affect chief executives' ability to rule by statute.

Sebastian M. Saiegh (Author)

9781107618008, Cambridge University Press

Paperback / softback, published 2 January 2014

250 pages, 17 b/w illus. 15 tables
22.9 x 15.2 x 1.4 cm, 0.37 kg

“In Ruling by Statute, Sebastian Saiegh challenges the conventional wisdom concerning law making that either agenda-setting powers and/or partisan whipping and voting cohesion are essential to a chief executive's power to make law. Instead, relying on positive political theory, statistical analysis, and country case studies, Saiegh provides a major advance in our understanding of how inter-branch bargaining affects lawmaking, showing, for example, that the unpredictability of legislators’ voting behavior is actually key in limiting or shaping a chief executive’s ability to successfully enact new laws. This book should be on the reading list in every course on democratic theory or comparative politics.”
– Matthew D. McCubbins, University of Southern California

What are the main factors that allow presidents and prime ministers to enact policy through acts of government that carry the force of law? Or, simply put, when does a government actually govern? The theory presented in this book provides a major advance in our understanding of statutory policy making. Using a combination of an original analytical framework and statistical techniques, as well as historical and contemporary case studies, the book demonstrates that, contrary to conventional wisdom, variations in legislative passage rates are the consequences of differences in uncertainty, not partisan support. In particular, it shows that a chief executive's legislative success depends on the predictability of legislators' voting behavior and whether buying votes is a feasible option. From a normative standpoint, the book reveals that governability is best served when the opposition has realistic chances of occasionally defeating the executive in the legislative arena.

Part I. Introduction: 1. Introduction
Part II. Theoretical Foundations: 2. On statutory policy making
3. A model of statutory policy making under uncertainty
Part III. Empirical Implications: 4. Measuring chief executives' statutory performance
5. Patterns of statutory policy making around the world
6. Political prowess or 'lady luck'?
7. Buying legislators
8. Electoral rules and lawmaking
Part IV. Normative Implications: 9. The political gap
Part V. Conclusions: 10. Conclusions.

Subject Areas: Parliamentary & legislative practice [LNDP], Political economy [KCP], Comparative politics [JPB], Politics & government [JP]