Rules and Reason
Perspectives on Constitutional Political Economy

This volume explores shifting conceptions of constitutional political economy and suggests possible future strategies for change.

Ram Mudambi (Edited by), Pietro Navarra (Edited by), Giuseppe Sobbrio (Edited by)

9780521659598, Cambridge University Press

Paperback, published 29 January 2001

336 pages, 1 b/w illus. 9 tables
23.1 x 15.5 x 2.1 cm, 0.45 kg

'… a significant scholarly contribution …'. Political Studies Review

Polarization in Western democracies and the collapse of centrally planned economies have led to calls for a redefinition of the state's core functions. This volume explores shifting conceptions of constitutional political economy anchoring the state from the viewpoints of theory, systems, and applications. It suggests why changes may be desirable and how these might be implemented. Part I addresses the writing of constitutions, the dynamic between constitutional order and civil society, the struggle between competitive and protectionist interests, the conflict between protecting expectations and moral evolution, and the role of cultural explanations of constitutional development patterns. Part II explores the interplay between electoral systems and constitutional engineering, the internal costs of political coalitions, and campaigns in pluralistic elections. Part III investigates the quest for stable, dynamic federal states with particular attention to opportunities and pitfalls in Europe. With a foreword and contributions from Nobel Laureate James M. Buchanan.

Foreword James M. Buchanan
1. Constitutional issues in modern democracies Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra and Giuseppe Sobbrio
2. On writing a constitution Dennis C. Mueller
3. Constitutional order and economic evolution: competitive and protectionist interests in democratic societies Viktor Vanberg
4. The efficacy of arbitrary rules James M. Buchanan and Yong J. Yoon
5. Constitutional political economy and civil society Charles K. Rowley
6. The constitutional conflict between protecting expectations and moral evolution Nicolaus Tiseman
7. Ideological competition and institutions: why cultural explanations of development patterns are not nonsense Michael J. Ensley and Michael C. Munger
8. Electoral systems and the art of constitutional engineering: an inventory of the main findings Bernard N. Grofman and Andrew Reynolds
9. Ordinary elections and constitutional arrangements Pierre Salmon
10. The cost imposed on political coalitions by constituent parties: the case of Italian National Elections Ram Mudambi, Peitro Navarra and Giuseppe Sobbrio
11. A model of two-party campaigns in pluralistic elections and evidence Chris W. Paul II and Allen W. Wilhite
12. Ensuring a stable Federal State: economics or political institutional design Mikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshokk and Olga V. Shevetsova
13. A proposal for dynamic European Federalism: FOCJ Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger
14. The Maastricht 'excessive deficit' rules and creative accounting Francesco Forte
15. Subsidiarity, federalism, and direct democracy as basic elements of a Federal European Constitution Friedrich Schneider and Alexander F. Wagner.

Subject Areas: Economic theory & philosophy [KCA]