Repeated Games

This landmark work significantly advances the literature on game theory with a masterful conceptual presentation of the CORE working papers published in 1994.

Jean-François Mertens (Author), Sylvain Sorin (Author), Shmuel Zamir (Author)

9781107030206, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 9 February 2015

598 pages, 22 b/w illus. 18 exercises
22.9 x 15.2 x 3.3 cm, 0.96 kg

'The study of long-term interactions - 'repeated games' - is one of the most fascinating, and fruitful, areas of research in game theory. The content of this volume - with its outstanding coverage, both broad and deep, and written by the leading experts - has long been regarded as the 'bible' of this area. It is high time that it be made widely available in book form.' Sergiu Hart, Alice Kusiel and Kurt Vorreuter University Professor, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Three leading experts have produced a landmark work based on a set of working papers published by the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) at the Université Catholique de Louvain in 1994 under the title 'Repeated Games', which holds almost mythic status among game theorists. Jean-François Mertens, Sylvain Sorin and Shmuel Zamir have significantly elevated the clarity and depth of presentation with many results presented at a level of generality that goes far beyond the original papers - many written by the authors themselves. Numerous results are new, and many classic results and examples are not to be found elsewhere. Most remain state of the art in the literature. This book is full of challenging and important problems that are set up as exercises, with detailed hints provided for their solutions. A new bibliography traces the development of the core concepts up to the present day.

1. Basic results on normal-form games
2. Basic results on extensive-form games
3. The beliefs space
4. General model of repeated games
5. Recursive games
6. Incomplete information on two sides
7. Stochastic games
8. Extensions and further results
9. Non-zero-sum games with incomplete information.

Subject Areas: Optimization [PBU], Economic statistics [KCHS], Econometrics [KCH], Microeconomics [KCC], Economics [KC]