Rejecting Compromise
Legislators' Fear of Primary Voters

This analysis of legislative behavior shows how primary voters can obstruct political compromise and outlines potential reforms to remedy gridlock.

Sarah E. Anderson (Author), Daniel M. Butler (Author), Laurel Harbridge-Yong (Author)

9781108738279, Cambridge University Press

Paperback / softback, published 11 February 2021

182 pages, 18 b/w illus. 12 tables
22.9 x 15.2 x 1.2 cm, 0.292 kg

'Anderson, Butler, and Harbridge-Yong make a compelling case that the threat of electoral punishment by primary voters is deterring politicians from supporting compromise policy proposals. This book also makes an important contribution to the broader debate over the mechanisms and consequences of polarization - the effects of elite perceptions of primary voters on legislative behavior is a critically important topic that has received too little scholarly attention.' Brendan Nyhan, Professor of Government, Dartmouth College

Legislative solutions to pressing problems like balancing the budget, climate change, and poverty usually require compromise. Yet national, state, and local legislators often reject compromise proposals that would move policy in their preferred direction. Why do legislators reject such agreements? This engaging and relevant investigation into how politicians think reveals that legislators refuse compromise - and exacerbate gridlock - because they fear punishment from voters in primary elections. Prioritizing these electoral interests can lead lawmakers to act in ways that hurt their policy interests and also overlook the broader electorate's preferences by representing only a subset of voters with rigid positions. With their solution-oriented approach, Anderson, Butler, and Harbridge-Yong demonstrate that improving the likelihood of legislative compromise may require moving negotiations outside of the public spotlight. Highlighting key electoral motives underlying polarization, this book is an excellent resource for scholars and students studying Congress, American politics, public policy, and political behavior.

1. Rejecting compromise, getting gridlock
2. Legislators reject half-loaf compromises
3. Legislators reject half-loaf compromises because they fear voter retribution
4. Primary voters as the source of punishment
5. Voter punishment is rare but real
6. Structuring negotiations in the shadow of primary voter punishment
7. Compromise, voter punishment in primaries, and legislative gridlock
References.

Subject Areas: Political structures: democracy [JPHV], Political science & theory [JPA], Politics & government [JP]