Refugee Law's Fact-Finding Crisis
Truth, Risk, and the Wrong Mistake

Hilary Evans Cameron demonstrates how the law that governs fact-finding in refugee hearings is malfunctioning, and suggests a way forward.

Hilary Evans Cameron (Author)

9781108448086, Cambridge University Press

Paperback / softback, published 8 August 2019

231 pages
23 x 15.3 x 1.2 cm, 0.4 kg

'This is a profound and brilliant book that should be read by all asylum claim decision-makers, judges, refugee lawyers, tribunal administrators, and asylum policy makers. Hilary Evans Cameron exposes the unexamined flaws within the laws of fact-finding related to refugee claim decisions. She performs an incisive autopsy on the body of ambiguous Canadian jurisprudence that allows decision-makers to justify arbitrary and inconsistent decisions. With scalpel-like efficiency, she peels away the layers of false rationales that decision-makers use to paper over the inescapable truth that refugee decisions are built upon radical, evidentiary uncertainty. Thankfully, Dr Cameron does offer more honest and effective judicial tools, namely risk analysis and abductive reasoning. These tools are more Swiss Army knife than magic wand, but they are desperately needed in a world of asylum law that ignores gross inconsistencies between decision-makers and between countries.' Peter Showler, former Chairperson, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

At a time when many around the world are fleeing their homes, seeking refugee protection has become a game of chance. Partly to blame is the law that governs how refugee status decision-makers resolve their doubts. This long-neglected branch of refugee law has been growing in the dark, with little guidance from the Refugee Convention and little attention from scholars. By looking closely at the Canadian jurisprudence, Hilary Evans Cameron provides the first full account of what this law is trying to accomplish in a refugee hearing. She demonstrates how a hole in the law's normative foundations is contributing to the dysfunction of one of the world's most respected refugee determination systems, and may well be undermining refugee protection across the globe. The author uses her findings to propose a new legal model of refugee status decision-making.

Introduction
Part I: 1. The wrong mistake
1.1. The traditional economic approach
1.2. A psychologically founded theory
1.3. A comparative study
1.4. Conclusion
Part II: 2. Setting the scene
2.1. At the refugee board
2.2. At the Federal Court
2.3. The case study: method and findings
3. The wrong mistake: sending a refugee home
3.1. Wrongly disbelieving the claimant
3.2. Overlooking objective danger
3.3. Denying claims on procedural grounds
3.4. Conclusion
4. Resolving doubt in the claimant's favour
4.1. The burden of proof
4.2. Standards of proof
4.3. Presumption of truthfulness
4.4. Conclusion
5. The wrong mistake: accepting an unfounded claim
: 5.1. Refugee claimants are ordinary litigants
5.2. The member is an ordinary decision-maker
5.3. Conclusion
6. Resolving doubt at the claimant's expense
6.1. The burden of proof
6.2. Standards of proof
6.3. Presumptions
6.4. Conclusion
7. In the hearing room: 7.1. Conflicting standards of proof
7.2. Permissible inferences: rational action and memory
7.3. Conclusion
Part III: 8. A way forward
8.1. The wrong mistake in international refugee law
8.2. The Karanakaran approach
8.3. Refugee status determination as an abductive risk assessment
8.4. Conclusion.

Subject Areas: International humanitarian law [LBBS], International human rights law [LBBR], Law & society [LAQ], Comparative law [LAM], Law [L]