Public Choice III

This book represents a considerable revision and expansion of Public Choice II (1989).

Dennis C. Mueller (Author)

9780521894753, Cambridge University Press

Paperback, published 17 February 2003

790 pages, 120 b/w illus. 75 tables
25.1 x 17.8 x 4.3 cm, 1.343 kg

'The book touches on almost every major area of public choice theory … I would strongly recommend the book to economists and political scientists who specialize in the rational choice approach to politics. It discusses and contains references to most of the major issues. Moreover, it does so in a way that is very intellectually stimulating. I cannot recommend it to these readers strongly enough … I would recommend Public Choice III to anyone who wants to find out more about public choice theory. It is the best and most extensive survey of the literature that I have read … Public Choice III is an excellent book and is strongly recommended.' International Journal of Social Economics

This book represents a considerable revision and expansion of Public Choice II (1989). Six new chapters have been added, and several chapters from the previous edition have been extensively revised. The discussion of empirical work in public choice has been greatly expanded. As in the previous editions, all of the major topics of public choice are covered. These include: why the state exists, voting rules, federalism, the theory of clubs, two-party and multiparty electoral systems, rent seeking, bureaucracy, interest groups, dictatorship, the size of government, voter participation, and political business cycles. Normative issues in public choice are also examined including a normative analysis of the simple majority rule, Bergson–Samuelson social welfare functions, the Arrow and Sen impossibility theorems, Rawls's social contract theory and the constitutional political economy of Buchanan and Tullock.

1. Introduction
Part I. Origins of the State: 2. The reason for collective choice - allocative efficiency
3. The reason for collective choice - redistribution
Part II. Public Choice in a Direct Democracy: 4. The choice of voting rule
5. Majority rule - positive properties
6. Majority rule - normative properties
7. Simple alternatives to majority rule
8. Complicated alternatives to majority rule
9. Exit, voice and disloyalty
Part III. Public Choice in a Representative Democracy: 10. Federalism
11. Two-party competition - deterministic voting
12. Two-party competition - probabilistic voting
13. Multiparty systems
14. The paradox of voting
15. Rent seeking
16. Bureaucracy
17. Legislatures and bureaucracies
18. Dictatorship
Part IV. Applications and Testing: 19. Political competition and macroeconomic performance
20. Interest groups, campaign contributions and lobbying
21. The size of government
22. Government size and economic performance
Part V. Normative public choice: 23. Social welfare functions
24. The impossibility of a social ordering
25. A just social contract
26. The constitution as a utilitarian contract
27. Liberal rights and social choices
Part VI. What Have We Learned?: 28. Has public choice contributed anything to the study of politics?
29. Allocation, redistribution, and public choice.

Subject Areas: Political economy [KCP], Economic theory & philosophy [KCA], Political science & theory [JPA], Sociology & anthropology [JH]