Probability and Evidence

This 1982 volume presents a clear and unified approach to a number of problems in the philosophy of science.

Paul Horwich (Author)

9780521283366, Cambridge University Press

Paperback, published 16 June 2011

158 pages
21.6 x 14 x 0.9 cm, 0.21 kg

In this volume, which was originally published in 1982, Paul Horwich presents a clear and unified approach to a number of problems in the philosophy of science. He diagnoses the failure of other attempts to resolve them as stemming from a too-rigid, all-or-nothing conception of belief, and adopts instead a Bayesian strategy, emphasising the degree of confidence to which we are entitled the light of scientific evidence. This probabilistic approach, he argues, yields a more complete understanding of the assumptions and procedures characteristic of scientific reasoning. It also accounts for the merits of simplicity, severe tests and surprising predictions, and provides a way in which the dispute between the realist and instrumentalist views of science might be resolved. The result is a crisp, well-focused contribution to the philosophy of science. The elaboration of an important conception of probability will stimulate anyone with an interest in the field.

Preface
Part I. Methodology: 1. Introduction
2. Aspects of the scientific method
3. A taste of Bayesianism
Part II. Probability: 4. The primitive theory
5. Subjectivism
6. The rationalist interpretation
7. The logical interpretation
8. The evidential state
9. The empirical interpretation
Part III. Confirmation: 10. Explications
11. The paradox
12. A Bayesian pseudo-solution to the problem of induction
13. Projection
Part IV. Induction
Section 1. The Nature of Inductive Inference
Section 2. Conditions of Rationality: 14. Demonstrable reliability
15. The demonstrable reliability of c+
16. Immodesty
17. Audacity
Section 3. The Justification of Induction: 18. The impossibility of a noncircular rationale
19. Inductive demonstration of reliability
20. Semantic justification
Part V. Prediction: 21. Surprise
22. Severe tests
23. Ad hoc hypothesis
24. Prediction versus accommodation
Part VI. Evidence: 25. The evidential value of varied data
26. The value of further data
Part VII. Realism: 27. Popper
28. Realism versus instrumentalism
29. Putnam
30. Glymour
31. Conclusion
Bibliography
Index.

Subject Areas: Analytical philosophy & Logical Positivism [HPCF5]