Probability and Evidence

This influential book offers a probabilistic approach to scientific reasoning to resolve central issues in the philosophy of science.

Paul Horwich (Author)

9781107142107, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 26 August 2016

146 pages, 10 b/w illus. 5 tables
23.5 x 15.7 x 1.2 cm, 0.35 kg

'… the strongest and most influential parts of Probability and Evidence are Horwich's solutions to various puzzles about scientific reasoning … the book might very well still be of considerable interest to those who are looking for an engaging and readable introduction to the topic of scientific reasoning from a Bayesian perspective.' Finnur Dellsén, Metascience

In this influential study of central issues in the philosophy of science, Paul Horwich elaborates on an important conception of probability, diagnosing the failure of previous attempts to resolve these issues as stemming from a too-rigid conception of belief. Adopting a Bayesian strategy, he argues for a probabilistic approach, yielding a more complete understanding of the characteristics of scientific reasoning and methodology. Presented in a fresh twenty-first-century series livery, and including a specially commissioned preface written by Colin Howson, illuminating its enduring importance and relevance to philosophical enquiry, this engaging work has been revived for a new generation of readers.

Preface to this edition Colin Howson
Part I. Methodology: 1. Introduction
2. Aspects of the scientific method
3. A taste of Bayesianism
Part II. Probability: 4. The primitive theory
5. Subjectivism
6. The rationalist interpretation
7. The logical interpretation
8. The evidential state
9. The empirical interpretation
Part III. Confirmation: 10. Explications
11. The paradox
12. A Bayesian pseudo-solution to the problem of induction
13. Projection
Part IV. Induction: Section 1. The Nature of Inductive Inference
Section 2. Conditions of Rationality: 14. Demonstrable reliability
15. The demonstrable reliability of c+
16. Immodesty
17. Audacity
Section 3. The Justification of Induction: 18. The impossibility of a noncircular rationale
19. Inductive demonstration of reliability
20. Semantic justification
Part V. Prediction: 21. Surprise
22. Severe tests
23. Ad hoc hypothesis
24. Prediction versus accommodation
Part VI. Evidence: 25. The evidential value of varied data
26. The value of further data
Part VII. Realism: 27. Popper
28. Realism versus instrumentalism
29. Putnam
30. Glymour
31. Conclusion
Bibliography
Index.

Subject Areas: Philosophy of science [PDA]