Power Plays
How International Institutions Reshape Coercive Diplomacy

Power Plays argues that international institutions prevent extortion in some areas, but cause states to shift coercive behavior into less effective policy domains.

Allison Carnegie (Author)

9781107547506, Cambridge University Press

Paperback / softback, published 3 September 2015

208 pages, 5 b/w illus. 8 tables
22.8 x 15.2 x 1.3 cm, 0.32 kg

'In this concise and theoretically sophisticated book, Allison Carnegie explains the dynamics of trade as a tool of coercive diplomacy. Bringing together insights from international political economy, security, and international organization, she shows how the WTO reduces economic underinvestment between states that are vulnerable to coercive diplomacy, and how reducing the coercive use of trade shifts international pressure towards other methods. This book is a nuanced and important work for all students of international relations.' Susan D. Hyde, Yale University

Coercive diplomacy - the use of threats and assurances to alter another state's behavior - is indispensable to international relations. Most scholarship has focused on whether and when states are able to use coercive methods to achieve their desired results. However, employing game-theoretic tools, statistical modeling, and detailed case study analysis, Power Plays builds and tests a theory that explains how states develop strategies of coercive diplomacy, how their targets shield themselves from these efforts, and the implications for interstate relations. Focusing on the World Trade Organization, Power Plays argues that coercive diplomacy often precludes cooperation due to fears of exploitation, but that international institutions can solve these problems by convincing states to eschew certain tools for coercive purposes.

1. Introduction
2. Theoretical framework
3. Bilateral agreements and state similarity
4. WTO membership as a commitment strategy
5. Coercive diplomacy in comparative perspective
6. Agreements and the displacement of coercion
7. Reduced effectiveness of coercion: evidence from the United States
8. Conclusion.

Subject Areas: Political economy [KCP], International economics [KCL], Diplomacy [JPSD], International relations [JPS]