Political Economy: Institutions, Competition and Representation
Proceedings of the Seventh International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics

This volume documents recent advances in the development of concepts and methods in political economy.

William A. Barnett (Edited by), Norman Schofield (Edited by), Melvin Hinich (Edited by)

9780521428316, Cambridge University Press

Paperback, published 30 July 1993

538 pages, 28 b/w illus. 8 tables
22.9 x 15.2 x 2.8 cm, 0.71 kg

The contents of this volume are drawn from the seventh International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics, and represent recent advances in the development of concepts and methods in political economy. Contributors include leading practitioners working on formal, applied, and historical approaches to the subject. The collection will interest scholars in the fields of political science and political sociology no less than economics. Part I outlines relevant concepts in political economy, including implementation, community, ideology, and institutions. Part II covers theory and applications of the spatial model of voting. Part III considers the different characteristics that govern the behaviour of institutions, while Part IV analyses competition between political representatives. Part V is concerned with the way in which government acquires information held by voters or advisors, and Part VI addresses government choice on monetary policy and taxation.

Political economy: a personal interpretation and an overview Norman J. Schofield
Part I. Perspectives on Political Economy: 1. Political ideology, communication, and community Melvin J. Hinich and Michael C. Munger
2. Implementation and enforcement in institutional modeling Leonid Hurwicz
3. Toward a theory of institutional change Douglas C. North
4. The development of contemporary political theory Peter C. Ordeshook
Part II. Representation and Voting: 5. Proportional representation, approval voting, and coalitionally straightforward elections Roger B. Myerson
6. Party competition in a spatial model of coalition Norman J. Schofield
7. Some foundations for empirical study in the Euclidean spatial model of social choice Craig A. Tovey
Part III. Political Institutions: 8. Communications in institutions: efficiency in a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with hidden information Randall L. Calvert
9. The courts and slavery in the United States: property rights and credible commitment John N. Drobak
10. On the pervasiveness of sophisticated sincerity Tim Groseclose and Keith Krehbiel
11. Initial versus continuing proposal power in legislative seniority systems Richard D. McKelvey and Raymond Riezman
Part IV. Political Competition: 12. Adverse selection and moral hazard in a repeated elections model Jeffrey S. Banks and Rangarajan K. Sundaram
13. Campaign contributions and party-candidate competition in services and policies David P. Baron and Jongryn Mo
14. Polarization, incumbency, and the personal vote John Londregan and Thomas Romer
15. Credibility and the responsiveness of direct legislation
Part V. Information Acquisition by Government: 16. Information acquisition and orthogonal argument David Austen-Smith
17. A welfare analysis of political action Susanne Lohmann
Part VI. Government Behaviouor
18. Monetary policy and credibility under exact monetary aggregation William A. Barnett
19. A general equilibrium model with endogenous government behaviour Eric Drissen and Frans Van Winden.

Subject Areas: Econometrics [KCH]