Personal Identity
Complex or Simple?

This book addresses whether personal identity is analyzable, with innovative discussion of 'complex' and 'simple' theories.

Georg Gasser (Edited by), Matthias Stefan (Edited by)

9781107014442, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 15 November 2012

268 pages, 2 b/w illus.
23.5 x 15.8 x 1.9 cm, 0.53 kg

'Gasser and Stefan's book offers an important and timely discussion of central issues in personal identity. This is an exceptionally fine volume …' George L?z?roiu, Review of Contemporary Philosophy

We take it for granted that a person persists over time: when we make plans, we assume that we will carry them out; when we punish someone for a crime, we assume that she is the same person as the one who committed it. Metaphysical questions underlying these assumptions point towards an area of deep existential and philosophical interest. In this volume, leading metaphysicians discuss key questions about personal identity, including 'What are we?', 'How do we persist?', and 'Which conditions guarantee our identity over time?' They discuss whether personal identity is 'complex', whereby it is analyzable in terms of simpler relations such as physical or psychological features, or whether it is 'simple', namely something that cannot be analyzed in terms of more fundamental relations. Their essays offer an innovative discussion of this topic and will be of interest to a wide readership in metaphysics.

Introduction
Part I. Framing the Question: 1. Chitchat on personal identity David Barnett
2. In search of the simple view Eric T. Olson
3. Personal identity, indeterminacy, and obligation Ryan Wasserman
4. Personal identity and its perplexities Harold W. Noonan
Part II. Arguments for and against Simplicity: 5. How to determine which is the true theory of personal identity Richard Swinburne
6. Against simplicity Sydney Shoemaker
7. The probable simplicity of personal identity E. J. Lowe
8. Reply to E. J. Lowe Sydney Shoemaker
9. The non-descriptive individual nature of conscious beings Martine Nida-Rümelin
Part III. Reconsidering Simplicity: 10. Personal identity: a not-so-simple simple view Lynne Rudder Baker
11. Is 'person' a sortal term? Christian Kanzian
12. Materialism, dualism, and 'simple' theories of personal identity Dean Zimmerman
13. The morphing block and diachronic personal identity Hud Hudson
References
Index.

Subject Areas: Philosophy: epistemology & theory of knowledge [HPK], Philosophy [HP]