Patronage at Work
Public Jobs and Political Services in Argentina

Describes what patronage employees do in exchange for their jobs and provides a novel explanation of why they do it.

Virginia Oliveros (Author)

9781316514085, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 25 November 2021

280 pages
23.6 x 15.8 x 2.1 cm, 0.5 kg

'Virginia Oliveros provides an essential reading for all scholars interested in the use of patronage for political gain. This is the most sophisticated and best documented research on patronage politics, presenting overwhelming evidence that partisan public employees can benefit their employers and also provide a higher level of effort on the job. Indeed, away from prior simplifications, patronage can have negative effects on democratic representation and also provide a higher level of service to voters. Now, that is something worth discussing!' Ernesto Calvo, Professor of Government and Politics, University of Maryland

In countries around the world, politicians distribute patronage jobs to supporters in exchange for a wide range of political services – such as helping with campaigns and electoral mobilization. Patronage employees (clients) engage in these political activities that support politicians (patrons) because their fates are tied to the political fate of their patrons. Although conventional wisdom holds that control of patronage significantly increases an incumbent's chance of staying in power, we actually know very little about how patronage works. Drawing on in-depth interviews, survey data, and survey experiments in Argentina, Virginia Oliveros details the specific mechanisms that explain the effect of patronage on political competition. This fascinating study is the first to provide a systematic analysis of the political activities of mid and low-level public employees in Latin America. It provides a novel explanation of the enforcement of patronage contracts that has wider implications for understanding the functioning of clientelist exchanges.

1. Introduction
2. A Theory of Self-Enforcing Patronage
3 Getting the Job
4. Patronage Contracts and Political Services: Evidence from List Experiments
5. Patronage, Favors, and the Personalization of Public Administration
6. Self- Enforcing Patronage Contracts
7. Beyond the Argentine Case
8. Conclusions and Broader Implications.

Subject Areas: Comparative politics [JPB], Politics & government [JP], Hispanic & Latino studies [JFSL4]