Optimal Regulation and the Law of International Trade
The Interface between the Right to Regulate and WTO Law

This book applies a law and economics methodology to enquire into the interface between regulation and international trade law.

Boris Rigod (Author)

9781107116122, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 13 November 2015

322 pages, 16 b/w illus. 5 tables
22.9 x 15.2 x 1.9 cm, 0.6 kg

Are the limitations imposed on World Trade Organization (WTO) members' right to regulate efficient? This is a question that is only scarcely, if ever, analysed in existing literature. Boris Rigod aims to provide an answer to this fundamental concern. Using the tools of economic analysis and in particular the concept of economic efficiency as a benchmark, the author states that domestic regulatory measures should only be subject to scrutiny by WTO bodies when they cause negative international externalities through terms of trade manipulations. He then suggests that WTO law, applied by the WTO judiciary can prevent WTO members from attaining optimal levels of regulation. By applying a law and economics methodology, Rigod provides an innovative solution to the problem of how to reconcile members' regulatory autonomy and WTO rules as well as offering a novel analytical framework for assessing domestic regulations in the light of WTO law.

Foreword Petros C. Mavroidis
Introduction
Law and economics in a nutshell
Part I. Optimal Regulation and International Trade Law - Theory: 1. Introduction to Part I
2. Optimal regulation
3. Deviations from optimal regulation
4. Deviations from optimal regulation and the role of international trade agreements
5. Conclusion to Part I
Part II. Optimal Regulation and International Trade Law - Application: 6. Introduction to Part II
7. Domestic regulation and the GATT
8. Domestic regulation and the TBT Agreement
9. Domestic regulation and the SPS
10. Conclusion to Part II.

Subject Areas: International economic & trade law [LBBM], Law [L], International trade [KCLT], Economics [KC]