Objectivism, Subjectivism, and Relativism in Ethics: Volume 25, Part 1

This book discusses whether we desire things because they are good, or whether they are good because we desire them.

Ellen Frankel Paul (Edited by), Fred Miller, Jr (Edited by), Jeffrey Paul (Edited by)

9780521719636, Cambridge University Press

Paperback, published 28 January 2008

442 pages
22.6 x 15 x 2.3 cm, 0.59 kg

Do we desire things because they are good, or are they good because we desire them? Objectivists answer that we desire things because they are good; subjectivists answer that things are good because we desire them. Further, does it make sense to account for moral disagreement by claiming, as the moral relativist does, that something might be good for one person but not for another? Some essays in this book consider whether objective moral truths can be grounded in an understanding of the nature of human beings as rational and social animals. Some discuss the ethical theories of historical figures - Aristotle, Aquinas, or Kant - or offer critical assessments of the work of recent and contemporary theorists - such as Moore, Putnam, Ayn Rand, Philippa Foot, and Rosalind Hursthouse. Other essays ask whether moral principles and values can be constructed through a process of practical reasoning or deliberation.

1. Substantive moral theory Philip Pettit
2. Virtue and nature Christopher W. Gowans
3. The importance of metaphysical realism for ethical knowledge Douglas B. Rasmussen
4. Why moral judgments can be objective Tibor R. Machan
5. The importance of the subject in objective morality: distinguishing objective from intrinsic value Tara Smith
6. Evaluative concepts and objective values: Rand on moral objectivity Darryl F. Wright
7. Aristotelian constructivism Mark LeBar
8. Moral construction as a task: sources and limits Thomas E. Hill, Jr.
9. Constructing normative objectivity in ethics David B. Wong
10. What does moral phenomenology tell us about moral objectivity? Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons
11. Imaginative resistance and psychological necessity Julia Driver
12. Objectivism and relational good Connie S. Rosati
13. Foundations in Aquinas's ethics Scott MacDonald
14. Revisionary intuitionism Michael Huemer
15. Moral objectivity Nicholas Rescher.

Subject Areas: Ethics & moral philosophy [HPQ], Philosophy [HP]