Naturalism, Evolution and Mind

This volume examines the impact of concepts from evolutionary biology on the philosophy of mind.

D. M. Walsh (Edited by)

9780521003735, Cambridge University Press

Paperback, published 30 August 2001

290 pages
22.8 x 15.3 x 1.8 cm, 0.389 kg

This collection of original essays covers a wide range of issues in current naturalised philosophy of mind. Particular attention is paid to the ways in which concepts drawn from evolutionary biology might enhance our understanding of the place of mind in the natural world. Issues covered include the advantages of construing the mind as an adaptation, the naturalisation of intentional and phenomenal content, the evolution of means-end reasoning, rationality and higher-order intentionality, methodological issues in cognitive ethology and evolutionary psychology.

1. Introduction Denis M. Walsh
2. Mind the adaptation Lawrence Shapiro
3. Should intentionality be naturalized? Thomas Bontly
4. Consciousness: explaining the phenomena Peter Carruthers
5. Norms, history and the mental Fred Dretske
6. What has natural information to do with intentional representation? Ruth Garrett Millikan
7. Locke-ing onto content Frank Jackson
8. The evolution of means-end reasoning David Papineau
9. Rationality and higher-order intentionality Alan Millar
10. Theory of mind in non-verbal apes: conceptual issues and the critical experiments Andrew Whiten
11. The principle of conservatism in cognitive ethology Elliott Sober
12. Domains, brains and evolution Michael Wheeler and Anthony Atkinson
13. Evolution and the human mind: how far can we go? Henry Plotkin.

Subject Areas: Philosophy of mind [HPM]