Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics

This book is a systematic and constructive treatment of a number of traditional issues at the foundation of ethics.

David Owen Brink (Author)

9780521359375, Cambridge University Press

Paperback, published 24 February 1989

356 pages
21.6 x 14 x 2 cm, 0.45 kg

'I hope and expect that publication will considerably advance the subject of moral philosophy by leading to a much higher level of discussion of the main issues.' Gilbert Harman, Princeton University

This book is a systematic and constructive treatment of a number of traditional issues at the foundation of ethics, the possibility and nature of moral knowledge, the relationship between the moral point of view and a scientific or naturalistic world view, the nature of moral value and obligation, and the role of morality in a person's rational life plan. In striking contrast to many traditional authors and to other recent writers in the field, David Brink offers an integrated defense of the objectivity of ethics.

Preface
1. Introduction
2. Moral realism and moral inquiry
3. Externalist moral realism
4. Does moral realsim matter?
5. A coherentist moral epistemology
6. Moral realism and the is/ought thesis
7. Posteriori objections to moral realism
8. Objective utilitarianism
Appendices
Bibliography
Index.

Subject Areas: Ethics & moral philosophy [HPQ]