Metaphysical Myths, Mathematical Practice
The Ontology and Epistemology of the Exact Sciences

Jody Azzouni argues that mathematical knowledge really is a special kind of knowledge with its own special means of gathering evidence.

Jody Azzouni (Author)

9780521062190, Cambridge University Press

Paperback / softback, published 15 May 2008

264 pages
22.9 x 15.2 x 1.5 cm, 0.4 kg

"Metaphysical Myths is written in an engaging style and contains a wealth of informative references . . . . the book is rich with arguments that will more than repay careful study." --Philosophical Books

Most philosophers of mathematics try to show either that the sort of knowledge mathematicians have is similar to the sort of knowledge specialists in the empirical sciences have or that the kind of knowledge mathematicians have, although apparently about objects such as numbers, sets, and so on, isn't really about those sorts of things as well. Jody Azzouni argues that mathematical knowledge really is a special kind of knowledge with its own special means of gathering evidence. He analyses the linguistic pitfalls and misperceptions philosophers in this field are often prone to, and explores the misapplications of epistemic principles from the empirical sciences to the exact sciences. What emerges is a picture of mathematics both sensitive to mathematical practice, and to the ontological and epistemological issues that concern philosophers.

Acknowledgements
Part I. Mathematical Practice and its Puzzles: 1. Metaphysical inertness
2. Metaphysical inertness and reference
3. The virtues of (second-order) theft
4. Intuitions about reference and axiom systems
5. Comparing mathematical terms and empirical terms I
6. Comparing mathematical terms and empirical terms II
7. The epistemic role puzzle
8. Benacerraf's puzzle
9. Comparing puzzles
10. Quine's approach I
11. Quine's approach II
Part II. The Stuff of Mathematics: Posits and Algorithms: 12. Introduction
13. An initial picture
14. Application and truth
15. Systems, application and truth
16. Quine's objections to truth by convention
17. Grades of ontological commitment
18. Multiply interpreting systems
19. Intuitions about reference revisited
Part III. The Geography of the A Priori: 20. Introduction
21. Algorithms again
22. Some observations on metamathematics
23. Incorrigible co-empiricalness
24. Why there are no incorrigible co-empirical truths
25. Normative considerations, the success of applied mathematics, concluding thoughts
Appendix
Bibliography
Index.

Subject Areas: Philosophy of science [PDA], Social & political philosophy [HPS]