Metaphysical Grounding
Understanding the Structure of Reality

This anthology systematically investigates philosophical ideas about priority.

Fabrice Correia (Edited by), Benjamin Schnieder (Edited by)

9781107022898, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 4 October 2012

320 pages, 7 b/w illus.
22.9 x 15.2 x 1.9 cm, 0.6 kg

'… an impressive achievement, contains penetrating insight, is clearly written, and carefully argued.' George L?z?roiu, Review of Contemporary Philosophy

Some of the most eminent and enduring philosophical questions concern matters of priority: what is prior to what? What 'grounds' what? Is, for instance, matter prior to mind? Recently, a vivid debate has arisen about how such questions have to be understood. Can the relevant notion or notions of priority be spelled out? And how do they relate to other metaphysical notions, such as modality, truth-making or essence? This volume of new essays, by leading figures in contemporary metaphysics, is the first to address and investigate the metaphysical idea that certain facts are grounded in other facts. An introduction introduces and surveys the debate, examining its history as well as its central systematic aspects. The volume will be of wide interest to students and scholars of metaphysics.

Grounding: an opinionated introduction Fabrice Correia and Benjamin Schnieder
1. Guide to ground Kit Fine
2. Scepticism about grounding Chris Daly
3. A clarification and defense of the notion of grounding Paul Audi
4. Grounding, transitivity, and contrastivity Jonathan Schaffer
5. Violations of the principle of sufficient reason (in Leibniz and Spinoza) Michael Della Rocca
6. Requirements on reality Robbie Williams
7. Varieties of ontological dependence Kathrin Koslicki
8. Asymmetrical dependence in individuation E. J. Lowe
9. Simple metaphysics and 'ontological dependence' Jody Azzouni
10. Truthmakers and dependence David Liggins
11. Expressivism about truth-making Stephen Barker.

Subject Areas: Philosophy: metaphysics & ontology [HPJ], Philosophy [HP]