Measurement in Psychology
A Critical History of a Methodological Concept

Traces history of measurement in social sciences/sciences to question whether psychological attributes are quantitative.

Joel Michell (Author)

9780521621205, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 17 June 1999

268 pages
23.7 x 16.2 x 2.3 cm, 0.513 kg

"Any psychologist engaged in measuring psychological attributes should read this very readable, scholarly book." APA Review of Books

This book traces how such a seemingly immutable idea as measurement proved so malleable when it collided with the subject matter of psychology. It locates philosophical and social influences (such as scientism, practicalism and Pythagoreanism) reshaping the concept and, at the core of this reshaping, identifies a fundamental problem: the issue of whether psychological attributes really are quantitative. It argues that the idea of measurement now endorsed within psychology actually subverts attempts to establish a genuinely quantitative science and it urges a new direction. It relates views on measurement by thinkers such as Holder, Russell, Campbell and Nagel to earlier views, like those of Euclid and Oresme. Within the history of psychology, it considers contributions by Fechner, Cattell, Thorndike, Stevens and Suppes, among others. It also contains a non-technical exposition of conjoint measurement theory and recent foundational work by leading measurement theorist R. Duncan Luce.

1. Trusting number, forsaking measure
2. The mental measurement nexus
3. The logic of quantification
4. Safety in numbers
5. Break-out from the classical paradigm
6. Beyond measure
7. Made to measure
8. The revolution 'that never happened'.

Subject Areas: Psychological theory & schools of thought [JMA], Social research & statistics [JHBC]