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Market Design
A Linear Programming Approach to Auctions and Matching
The introduction to market design discusses the theory and empirical results relevant for the design of multi-object auctions and matching.
Martin Bichler (Author)
9781107173187, Cambridge University Press
Hardback, published 21 December 2017
292 pages, 18 b/w illus.
25.3 x 17.8 x 2 cm, 0.69 kg
'This book by Bichler is very readable and suitable for various types of courses such as those for advanced undergraduate and entry level graduate students. It will serve its intended purpose as a textbook for students with backgrounds in computer science, information systems, mathematics, and management science, apart from other disciplines such as economics and operations research … I feel it will also be useful for other categories of readers such as bidders, consultants, market designers, regulators, professionals, and researchers.' S.V. Nagaraj, SIGACT News
The digital economy led to many new services where supply is matched with demand for various types of goods and services. More and more people and organizations are now in a position to design market rules that are being implemented in software. The design of markets is challenging as it needs to consider strategic behavior of market participants, psychological factors, and computational problems in order to implement the objectives of a designer. Market models in economics have not lost their importance, but the recent years have led to many new insights and principles for the design of markets, which are beyond traditional economic theory. This book introduces the fundamentals of market design, an engineering field concerned with the design of real-world markets.
1. Introduction
Part I. Microeconomic Fundamentals: 2. Game-theoretical basics
3. Mechanism design
4. Single-object auctions
Part II. Multi-Object Auction Design: 5. An overview of multi-object auctions
6. The simultaneous multi-round auction format
7. Sealed-bid multi-object auctions
8. Open multi-object auctions
9. The combinatorial clock auction formats
Part III. Approximation and Matching Markets
10. Approximation mechanisms
11. Matching markets
12. Outlook
Part IV. Appendices: Mathematical Optimization
A. Linear optimization
B. Algorithms and complexity.
Subject Areas: Algorithms & data structures [UMB], E-commerce: business aspects [KJE], Microeconomics [KCC]