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Lessons from the Financial Crisis
Causes, Consequences, and Our Economic Future
Rob Quail (Edited by)
9780470561775, Wiley
Hardback, published 18 June 2010
704 pages
25.9 x 18.5 x 3.4 cm, 1.311 kg
The world's best financial minds help us understand today's financial crisis With so much information saturating the market for the everyday investor, trying to understand why the economic crisis happened and what needs to be done to fix it can be daunting. There is a real need, and demand, from both investors and the financial community to obtain answers as to what really happened and why. Lessons from the Financial Crisis brings together the leading minds in the worlds of finance and academia to dissect the crisis. Divided into three comprehensive sections-The Subprime Crisis; The Global Financial Crisis; and Law, Regulation, the Financial Crisis, and The Future-this book puts the events that have transpired in perspective, and offers valuable insights into what we must do to avoid future missteps. We currently face a serious economic crisis, but in understanding it, we can overcome the challenges it presents. This well-rounded resource offers the best chance to get through the current situation and learn from our mistakes.
Acknowledgments xv Editor’s Note xvii Introduction xix PART I Overview of the Crisis 1 1 Leverage and Liberal Democracy 3 2 A Property Economics Explanation of the Global Financial Crisis 9 3 Of Subprimes and Sundry Symptoms: The Political Economy of the Financial Crisis 17 4 The Political Economy of the Financial Crisis of 2008 23 5 The Global Financial Crisis of 2008: WhatWent Wrong? 31 6 The Roots of the Crisis and How to Bring It to a Close 37 7 Enron Rerun: The Credit Crisis in Three Easy Pieces 43 8 The Global Crisis and Its Origins 51 9 Four Paradoxes of the 2008–2009 Economic and Financial Crisis 59 10 Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis 69 PART II Causes and Consequences of the Financial Crisis 77 11 The Origins of the Financial Crisis 79 12 Ten Myths about SubprimeMortgages 87 13 The Financial Crisis: How Did We Get Here and Where Do We Go Next? New Evidence on How the Crisis Spread Among Financial Institutions 95 14 A Decade of Living Dangerously: The Causes and Consequences of theMortgage, Financial, and Economic Crises 103 15 Making Sense of the Subprime Crisis 109 16 Miraculous Financial Engineering or Legacy Assets? 119 17 TheMaking and Ending of the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 125 18 The SubprimeMortgage Problem: Causes and Likely Cure 133 19 Sequence of Asset Bubbles and the Global Financial Crisis 139 PART III Borrowers 147 20 The Past, Present, and Future of Subprime Mortgages 149 21 FHA Loans and Policy Responses to Credit Availability 155 22 The Single-Family Mortgage Industry in the Internet Era: Technology Developments and Market Structure 163 23 Speed Kills? Mortgage Credit Boom and the Crisis 175 24 SubprimeMortgages:What We Have Learned From a New Class of Homeowners 181 25 Rating Agencies: Facilitators of Predatory Lending in the SubprimeMarket 191 PART IV The Process of Securitization 197 26 A Primer on the Role of Securitization in the Credit Market Crisis of 2007 199 27 Incentives in the Originate-to-DistributeModel of Mortgage Production 209 28 Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans 217 29 Tumbling Tower of Babel: Subprime Securitization and the Credit Crisis 225 30 The Incentives of Mortgage Servicers and Designing Loan Modifications to Address the Mortgage Crisis 231 31 The Contribution of Structured Finance to the Financial Crisis: An Introductory Overview 239 32 Problematic Practices of Credit Rating Agencies: The Neglected Risks ofMortgage-Backed Securities 247 33 Did Asset Complexity Trigger Ratings Bias? 259 34 The Pitfalls of Originate-to-Distribute in Bank Lending 267 PART V RiskManagement and Mismanagement 275 35 Behavioral Basis of the Financial Crisis 277 36 Risk Management Failures During the Financial Crisis 283 37 The Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to Risk Models 293 38 The Future of Risk Modeling 301 39 What Happened to Risk Management During the 2008–2009 Financial Crisis? 307 40 Risk Management Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis for Derivative Exchanges 317 PART VI The Problem of Regulation 325 41 Regulation and Financial Stability in the Age of Turbulence 327 42 The Financial Crisis of 2007–2009: Missing Financial Regulation or Absentee Regulators? 337 43 The Demise of the United Kingdom’s Northern Rock and Large U.S. Financial Institutions: Public Policy Lessons 345 44 Why Securities Regulation Failed to Prevent the CDO Meltdown 355 45 Curbing Optimism in Managerial Estimates Through Transparent Accounting: The Case of Securitizations 361 46 Basel II Put on Trial: What Role in the Financial Crisis? 369 47 Credit Rating Organizations, Their Role in the Current Calamity, and Future Prospects for Reform 377 48 Global Regulation for GlobalMarkets? 383 49 Financial Regulation, Behavioral Finance, and the Global Financial Crisis: In Search of a New RegulatoryModel 391 PART VII Institutional Failures 401 50 Why Financial Conglomerates Are at the Center of the Financial Crisis 403 51 Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: A Case Study from the S&P 500 411 52 Secondary-Management Conflicts 419 53 The Financial Crisis and the Systemic Failure of Academic Economics 427 54 FannieMae and FreddieMac: Privatizing Profit and Socializing Loss 437 55 Disclosure’s Failure in the SubprimeMortgage Crisis 443 PART VIII The Federal Reserve, Monetary Policy, and the Financial Crisis 451 56 Federal Reserve Policy and the Housing Bubble 453 57 The Greenspan and Bernanke Federal Reserve Roles in the Financial Crisis 461 58 The Risk Management Approach to Monetary Policy: Lessons from the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 467 59 Reawakening the Inflationary Monster: U.S. Monetary Policy and the Federal Reserve 475 60 The Transformation of the Federal Reserve System Balance Sheet and Its Implications 483 PART IX Implications of the Crisis for Our Economic Systems 493 61 Systemic Risk and Markets 495 62 The Transmission of Liquidity Shocks During the Crisis: Ongoing Research into the Transmission of Liquidity Shock Suggests the Emergence of a Range of New Channels During the Credit Crisis 501 63 Credit Contagion From Counterparty Risk 509 PART X International Dimensions of the Financial Crisis 517 64 Only in America? When Housing Boom Turns to Bust 519 65 The Equity Risk Premium Amid a Global Financial Crisis 525 66 Australia’s Experience in the Global Financial Crisis 537 67 Collapse of a Financial System: An Icelandic Saga 545 68 Iceland’s Banking Sector and the Political Economy of Crisis 551 69 The Subprime Crisis: Implications for Emerging Markets 559 PART XI Financial Solutions and Our Economic Future 569 70 The Long-Term Cost of the Financial Crisis 571 71 Coping with the Financial Crisis: Illiquidity and the Role of Government Intervention 579 72 Fiscal Policy for the Crisis 587 73 The Future of Securitization 595 74 Modification ofMortgages in Bankruptcy 601 75 The Shadow Bankruptcy System 609 76 Reregulating FannieMae and FreddieMac 617 77 Would Greater Regulation of Hedge Funds Reduce Systemic Risk? 625 78 Regulating Credit Default Swaps 633 Index 641
George Bragues
Gunnar Heinsohn and Frank Decker
Ashok Bardhan
Roger D. Congleton
Hershey H. Friedman and Linda Weiser Friedman
James K. Galbraith
Jonathan C. Lipson
Peter L. Swan
John E. Marthinsen
Steven L. Schwarcz
Martin N. Baily, Robert E. Litan, and Matthew S. Johnson
Yuliya Demyanyk
James R. Barth, Tong Li, Lu Wenling, and Glenn H. Yago
Jon A. Garfinkel and Jarjisu Sa-Aadu
Kristopher S. Gerardi, Andreas Lehnert, Shane M. Sherlund, and Paul Willen
Ivo Pezzuto
Austin Murphy
Ronald D. Utt
Abol Jalilvand and A. G. (Tassos) Malliaris
Shane M. Sherlund
Dr. Marsha Courchane, Rajeev Darolia, and Dr. Peter Zorn
Forrest Pafenberg
Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, Deniz Igan, and Luc Laeven
Todd J. Zywicki and Satya Thallam
David J. Reiss
John D. Martin
Robert W. Kolb
Benjamin J. Keys, Tanmoy Mukherjee, Amit Seru, and Vikrant Vig
Bruce I. Jacobs
Larry Cordell, Karen Dynan, Andreas Lehnert, Nellie Liang, and Eileen Mauskopf
Adrian A.R.J.M. van Rixtel and Sarai Criado
Phil Hosp
Vasiliki Skreta and Laura Veldkamp
Antje Berndt and Anurag Gupta
J. V. Rizzi
Dr. Michel Crouhy
Erik F. Gerding
Elizabeth Sheedy
Michael McAleer, Juan-Angel Jim´enez-Martin, and Teodosio P´erez-Amaral
Jayanth Varma
David S. Bieri
George G. Kaufman and A. G. Malliaris
Robert A. Eisenbeis and George G. Kaufman
Richard E. Mendales
Stephen Bryan, Steven Lilien, and Bharat Sarath
Francesco Cannata and Mario Quagliariello
Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV and Chris Sagers
Michael W. Taylor and Douglas W. Arner
Emilios Avgouleas
Arthur E. Wilmarth
Brian R. Cheffins
Steven L. Schwarcz
David Colander, Michael Goldberg, Armin Haas, Alan Kirman, Katarina Juselius, Brigitte Sloth, and Thomas Lux
David Reiss
Steven L. Schwarcz
Lawrence H. White
John Ryan
Marc D. Hayford and A. G. Malliaris
Kevin Dowd and Martin Hutchinson
Peter Stella
Steven L. Schwarcz
Nathaniel Frank, Brenda Gonz´alez-Hermosillo, and Heiko Hesse
Philippe Jorion and Gaiyan Zhang
Luci Ellis
John R. Graham and Campbell R. Harvey
Christine Brown and Kevin Davis
Tryggvi Thor Herbertsson
James A. H. S. Hine and Ian Ashman
William B. Gwinner and Anthony B. Sanders
Murillo Campello, John R. Graham, and Campbell R. Harvey
Bastian Breitenfellner and Niklas Wagner
Antonio Spilimbergo, Steven Symansky, Olivier Blanchard, and Carlo Cottarelli
Steven L. Schwarcz
dam J. Levitin
Jonathan C. Lipson
Dwight M. Jaffee
Michael R. King and Philipp Maier
Houman B. Shadab
Subject Areas: Finance & accounting [KF]
