Knowledge and Evidence

Paul K. Moser (Author)

9780521423632, Cambridge University Press

Paperback, published 26 July 1991

300 pages
21.6 x 14 x 1.7 cm, 0.38 kg

'Paul Moser's book is a powerful antidote to the naive but morally and intellectually damaging 'relativism', that pervades much contemporary social and literary theory, but it is much more than that. Unfashionably but persuasively, Moser defends a foundationalist epistemology and a verison of the correspondence theory of truth.' The Times Higher Education Supplement

Paul Moser's book defends what has been an unfashionable view in recent epistemology: the foundationalist account of knowledge and justification. Since the time of Plato philosophers have wondered what exactly knowledge is. This book develops a new account of perceptual knowledge which specifies the exact sense in which knowledge has foundations. The author argues that experiential foundations are indeed essential to perceptual knowledge, and he explains what knowledge requires beyond justified true beliefs. In challenging prominent sceptical claims that we have no justified beliefs about the external world, the book outlines a theory of rational belief.

Acknowedgments
Introduction
1. Conditions for propositional knowledge
2. Minimal epistemic reasons
3. Justifying epistemic reasons
4. Foundationalism and some alternatives
5. Procedural epistemic rationality
6. Propositional knowledge
References
Index.

Subject Areas: Philosophy: epistemology & theory of knowledge [HPK]