Kings as Judges
Power, Justice, and the Origins of Parliaments

The first systematic account of how structures of justice led to the emergence of representative institutions and state-formation in Western Europe.

Deborah Boucoyannis (Author)

9781107162792, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 15 July 2021

400 pages
23.6 x 16 x 2.7 cm, 0.72 kg

'Boucoyannis develops an original and fascinating theoretical argument, centering on the role of powerful kings and their ability to call on their nobilities to gather in one location and deal with issues of justice. She also amasses a wealth of empirical evidence from a diverse set of countries … The book contributes with new knowledge on a host of important issues, such as the importance of including the nobility for building strong and viable institutions. Reading it was a great academic experience, and I have subsequently modified several of my prior beliefs about historical political development.' Carl Henrik Knutsen, Governance

How did representative institutions become the central organs of governance in Western Europe? What enabled this distinctive form of political organization and collective action that has proved so durable and influential? The answer has typically been sought either in the realm of ideas, in the Western tradition of individual rights, or in material change, especially the complex interaction of war, taxes, and economic growth. Common to these strands is the belief that representation resulted from weak ruling powers needing to concede rights to powerful social groups. Boucoyannis argues instead that representative institutions were a product of state strength, specifically the capacity to deliver justice across social groups. Enduring and inclusive representative parliaments formed when rulers could exercise power over the most powerful actors in the land and compel them to serve and, especially, to tax them. The language of rights deemed distinctive to the West emerged in response to more effectively imposed collective obligations, especially on those with most power.

Preface and acknowledgments
Part I. The origins of Representative Institutions: Power, Land, and Courts: 1. Introduction
2. A theory of institutional emergence: regularity, functional fusion, and the origins of parliament
3. Explaining institutional layering and functional fusion: the role of power
Part II. Origins of Representative Rractice: Power, Obligation, and Taxation: 4. Taxation and representative practice: bargaining vs compellence
5. Variations in representative practice: 'absolutist' France and Castile
6. No taxation of elites, no representative institutions
Part III. Trade, Towns, and the Political Economy of Representation: 7. Courts, institutions, and cities: Low Countries and Italy
8. Courts, institutions, and territory: Catalonia
9. The endogeneity of trade: the English wool trade and the Castilian mesta
Part IV. Land, Conditionality, and Property Rights: 10. Power, land, and second-best constitutionalism: Central and Northern Europe
11. Conditional land law, property rights, and 'Sultanism': premodern English and Ottoman land regimes
12. Land, tenure, and assemblies: Russia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
Part V. Why Representation in the West: Petitions, Collective Responsibility, and Supra-Local Organization: 13. Petitions, collective responsibility, and representative practice: England, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire
Conclusion
Bibliography
Index.

Subject Areas: Political economy [KCP], Political structure & processes [JPH], Comparative politics [JPB], Politics & government [JP], Social theory [JHBA], Sociology [JHB], General & world history [HBG]